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ABSTRACT 
This paper with the title "Kant's Transcendental Method and Its Under-
Thematized Problem" consists of two main parts. In the first half, the primary 
objective is to investigate the method of reasoning Kant employed in the first 
Critique. Focus is put on what is known to modem Kant scholarship as 
"transcendental argument." In the outset, two common misinterpretations, namely, 
the hypothetical and the analytic interpretation, are examined and refuted 
respectively. The hypothetical interpretation is not sustainable simply because the 
conclusion of a hypothetical argument could never fulfill the apodictic certainty 
required by Kant's project of transcendental philosophy. The analytic interpretation, 
on the other hand, does not stand either, for the argument, if interpreted as deductive, 
is either deductively invalid, or it could be made deductively valid only by 
introducing unjustifiable premises. 
The correct interpretation ofKant's transcendental method must be grounded 
upon the correct understanding of the general problem of transcendental philosophy: 
“how are synthetic judgments possible a prioriT This formula does not mean a 
program to derive analytically from a set of "synthetic a priori” premises to 
"synthetic a priori” conclusion. On the contrary, what Kant concerns about here is 
rather the mode of judging and the mode of knowledge acquisition. Kant's 
transcendental argument, which aims at justifying the possibility of arriving a priori 
at synthetic judgments, is itself an attempt to arrive a priori at synthetic judgments. 
As the proofs in mathematics are guided by a priori intuition, the 
transcendental argument has its own guide, namely, possible experience. On the one 
hand, the argument begins with affirming the possibility of experience and reveals its 
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necessary (real) conditions accordingly. On the other hand, the revelation of the 
necessary conditions serves in retum to account for the possibility of experience. 
This bi-directional justification indicates a special form of circularity, i.e., the 
structure of self-referentiality, The fact of human knowledge together with the 
fundamental characteristics of its form are affirmed simultaneously with the very act 
� oftranscendental inquiry. Consequently, the alternative forms ofknowledge are ruled 
out and the necessary conditions of the only possible form of knowledge are thereby 
justified. 
Owing to this peculiarity in regard of the logical structure of the 
transcendental argument, Kant borrows a kind of argument called deduction from the 
judicial tradition, and hence he calls the most central argument in the Critique 
transcendental deduction. The aim of a deduction is to justify the right of a 
questioned claim by tracing back to its origin. With such a mission as backdrop, an 
access to our cognitive power and its activities becomes an operative condition of 
setting forth a deduction. For Kant, the one and only way of access to our cognitive 
power is put under the name of reflection. 
Kant characterizes reflection as a consciousness of the relation of various 
presentations to the source of cognition. However, the nature of this kind of 
consciousness may easily lead us into confusion, for it seems that reflection could 
neither be interpreted as an empirical consciousness nor as an intellectual. This 
apparent conflict indicates the need of proceeding to the second part of this paper 
which focuses on the problem of self-consciousness in Kant's philosophy. Jn the 
second half, we attempt to resolve the apparent conflict and to settle Kant's 
ambiguous position on the problem. The interpretation purporting to solve the 
problem inherited from the transcendental method must be coherent with Kant's 
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transcendental philosophy in general and with the doctrine of inner sense and his 
criticism of rational psychology in particular. 
Interpreting reflection as a kind of empirical consciousness is to declare inner 
sense as the only legitimate access to our cognitive power. However, as our inner 
sense is in continual flux, all proofs grounded upon it could never yield any 
universality and necessity; hence this interpretation does not stand. On the other 
hand, the interpretation of reflection as a kind of intellectual consciousness seems to 
be in conflict with Kant's criticism of rational psychology, for Kant, in the 
Paralogisms, has decisively refuted any claims of rational self-cognition. 
The clue to the above dilemma is to characterize reflection as an intellectual 
self-consciousness which differs from both empirical self-consciousness (inner sense) 
and rational self-cognition (rational psychology). Reflection is not an empirical self-
consciousness because it is not an experience at all. It is not presented through the 
form of sensibility, and not determined in the same time series as with other 
empirical events. On the other hand, reflection is also not a rational self-cognition. 
For Kant, every cognition consists of both intuition and thought; since reflection is 
only a thought, it is actually not a cognition at all. In fact, reflection, as an intellectual 
self-consciousness, is the presentation of the self-activity of a thinking subject by 
which the form of our cognition and the act of understanding's synthesis are revealed 
immediately. This peculiar nature of reflection shows itself to be relevant in serving 
as the operative ground of transcendental inquiry. 
Nevertheless, the problem of self-consciousness still needs further 
exploration. Compared with the effort Kant spent in tackling the cognition of objects, 
the problem of the cognition of subject is much too undermined, or under-
thematized. In the subsequent development of westem philosophy, this necessary, 
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though under-thematized element in Kant's thought is again and again revived. In 
different forms of presentations, it engages the attention of many a great 
philosophical spirit even up to our days. 
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KANT，S TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD AND lTS UNDER-THEMATIZED PROBLEM 
1. INTRODUCTION 
" . . . and of course the clear and certain truth no man has seen nor will 
there be anyone who knows about the gods and what I say about all 
things. For even if，in the best cases, one happened to speak just of what 
has been brought to pass, still he himself would not know. But opinion is 
allotted to all." - Xenophanes^ 
No sooner had the ancient Greeks begun to philosophize than they recognized 
the distinction between knowledge [episteme] and opinion [doxa]. Being one of the 
earliest philosophers, Xenophanes has already remarked that opinion is adopted by 
everyone but truth remains unseen. Another major representative of the Eleatic 
school, Parmenides, in his Fragments, further puts the two “ways，，into contrast: the 
Way of Truth [aletheia] and the Way of Seeming [doxa]} Opinion is the seeming 
way to truth but conceals the genuine access of it. Truth can be attained only by 
knowledge. According to the Eleatic school, truth is accessible only by the intellect, 
while sense experience leads to deception and illusion? Despite of the controversy 
over this conception of the accessibility of truth, the sharp distinction between 
knowledge and opinion has remained a major philosophical concem in the 
subsequent development of westem philosophy, a concem shared also by Immanuel 
Kant, According to him, opinion is never permissible in philosophy. 
1 Xenophanes, Fragments, Fragment 34. English translation quoted from J. H. Lesher, Xenophanes of 
Colophon: Fragments: Text and Translation with a Commentary, Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1992, my italics. 
2 The above wordings and interpretation of Parmenides follow that of F. M. Comford. See F. M. 
Comford, Plato and Parmenides: Parmenides ‘ Way of Tmth and Plato 's Parmenides, New York: 
The Liberal Arts Press, 1957, pp. 28 — 62. 
3 This interpretation is confirmed by Kant's own view of the Eleatic school. "Its [the Eleatic sect's] 
founder was Xenophanes, and after him Parmenides. They taught that in the sense there is nothing but 
deception, and only in understanding is there truth." (Logic 261) 
4 Actually, Kant draws a threefold rather than twofold distinction, namely, opinion, faith and 
knowledge. However, he maintains that faith is valid only in the practical sphere. Therefore, within 
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"In judgments issuing from pure reason, holding an opinion is not 
permitted at all. For such judgments are not supported by experiential 
bases. Rather, where everything is necessary, there everything is to be 
cognized a priori. Hence there the principle of connection requires 
universality and necessity, and hence complete certainty; otherwise one 
fmds in it no guidance to truth." (A 822-3 / B 850-1)5 
Instead of holding mere opinion, Kant holds that philosophy always aims at 
attaining knowledge. For Kant, knowledge can be divided into two kinds: historical 
knowledge [cognitio ex datis] and rational knowledge [cognitio ex principiis]，The 
former is knowledge we acquire through our own experience or through someone's 
report. Since experience only tells us what is, but not what necessarily must be, 
knowledge derived from it can never yield absolute certainty. Therefore, instead of 
historical or empirical knowledge, rational knowledge is the sole candidate capable 
of fulfilling the demand for universality and necessity. 
Ever since Greek antiquity, philosophy has been assigned the task of 
discovering truth and certitude, and it will never be satisfied with any contingent 
the theoretical sphere, opinion and knowledge are contrary to each other. "Assent — or the 
judgment's subjective validity — in reference to conviction (which holds [subjectively and] at the 
same time objectively) has the following three levels: opinion:faith, and knowledge.” (A 822 / B 850) 
"However, only in a practical reference can the theoretically insufficient assent be called belief [faith] 
at all." (A 823 /B851) 
5 All citations of Critique of Pure Reason in this thesis follow the new translation offered by Wemer 
S. Pluhar (1996) rather than that of Kemp Smith (1968). Although Smith's translation has been 
regarded as the standard for a couple of decades, Pluhar's new translation surpasses that of Smith by 
embracing many contemporary Kant scholarships with improved accuracy and readability (One ofthe 
improvements is expressed in footnote 9 on page 10). Despite the comparative shortcomings, Smith's 
translation is certainly worth our serious attention. Thus, it will be put as a reference whenever 
necessary. 
6 According to Pluhar's translation, the above demarcation should be read as historical cognition 
[historische Erkenntnis] and rational cognition [rationale Erkenntnis]. Pluhar consistently renders the 
German word "Erkenntnis" as "cognition" (and in a few cases as "recognition"), but never as 
"knowledge." Pluhar reserves the word "knowledge" to the German word “Wissen” (and sometimes 
“Kenntnis”). "The reason is that on Kant's view certain cases of practical cognition {Erkenntis), such 
as that of God, are not instances of knowledge (Wissen), but of rational (moral) faith." (Translator's 
footnote 6 below A vii) I think that the term "cognition" has the sense of signifying an activity of 
knowledge acquisition, while the term "knowledge" signifies more the product of this activity. The 
term "cognition" should be a better translation of the German word “Erkenntis,” but in English 
medium, we are more accustom to the term "knowledge." Therefore, in this thesis, both terms will be 
used. I shall take the advantage of readability and contextual smoothness in place of accuracy. The 
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apprehension of reality. Therefore, philosophy, by its own nature, always aims at 
attaining rational knowledge. But, is the pursuit of rational knowledge possible? It is 
undoubtedly one of the most perplexing questions throughout the history of 
philosophy. By casting doubt on the possibility of attaining any knowledge at all, the 
Sophists opened up the skeptic tradition of westem thoughts. The skeptic heritage of 
the ancient Greeks underwent various modifications before its eventual reformulation 
by David Hume. In Hume's w o r k s , the presumed necessary connection between 
cause and effect is very much questioned. He argues that the validity of universal 
causal principle could neither be deduced from the analysis of the concept of event, 
nor be proved by the frequent and uniform connection between particular 
coincidences. Hume therefore declares it as groundless to take the law of causality as 
necessary and universal; for him it is merely by our habitual association we assign to 
causality the standing of an "apodictic law.” 
It is well-known that Hume was accredited with having awakened Kant from 
his dogmatic slumber) However, this credit ofHume did not prevent him from being 
severely criticized by Kant in retum. While finding in Hume's empiricism the 
antidote against the dogmatism of rationalist philosophy, Kant very soon discovered 
that the skeptical overtone of Hume's empiricism was theoretically speaking a total 
disaster. By questioning and invalidating the concept of causality, so maintained 
Kant, Hume has brought the foundation of natural sciences, indeed even our common 
sensible world, into crisis. In order to rescue causality together with its intended 
necessity and universality claims, Kant explicitly formulates the general problem of 
term "cognition" and "knowledge," in my thesis, can be aLmost regarded as synonymous. The choice 
of employment will be depended on the contexts. 
7 See David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Selections from a Treatise of 
Human Nature, La Salle,Ill.: Open Court, 1956. 
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transcendental philosophy, in his Critique of Pure Reason and other major works, as: 
"How are synthetic judgments possible a priori?" [Wie sind synthetische Urteile a 
priori mdglich?] (B 19)^  
L1. The General Problem of Transcendental Philosophy 
In order to understand the general problem of transcendental philosophy as 
formulated by Kant, we should first give a brief elucidation of the concept of analytic 
and synthetic alongside with that of a priori and a posteriori. Kant himself proposes 
a three-step elucidation of this problem in his essay [Preisschrift], What Real 
Progress has Metaphysics made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff? 
8 "I Openly confess that my remembering David Hume was the very thing which many years ago first 
interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy 
quite a new direction." (Prol. 5) 
9 The English translation of the general problem of transcendental philosophy usually follows that of 
Kemp Smith, which is rendered as “how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" (B 73, Smith's 
translation) or "how are a priori synthetic judgments possible?" (B 19，Smith's translation) However, 
these translations are inaccurate. 
Actually, Kant has expressed the general formula several times in his works, but he himself 
has not used the same wordings consistently in different occasions. Nonetheless, among the various 
expressions, Smith mistranslates the part of speech of the term “a priori." This point can be shown by 
observing the German origin of the formula and by comparing Smith's translations with the others. 
For example, in the Critique of Pure Reason, it appears two times: ‘Wie sind synthetische Urteile a 
priori m6glichT (Ak. III 39) [Smith: "How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?" Pluhar: "How 
are synthetic judgments possible a priori?" (B 19)] and ‘Wie sind synthetische Satze a priori 
mdglichT (Ak. III 73) [Smith: "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" Pluhar: “How are 
synthetic propositions possible a priori?" (B73)]; in the Prolegomena, ‘Wie sind synthetische Sdtze a 
priori mdglichT (Ak. IV 276) [Ellington: "How are synthetic propositions a priori possible?" (Prol. 
21)] and ‘‘Wie sind synthetische Erkenntnisse a priori mdglichT (Ak. IV 278) [Ellington: "How are 
synthetic cognitions a priori possible?" (Prol. 23)]; in the Critique of Judgment, “Wie sind 
synthetische Erkenntnifiurtheile a priori mdglichT (Ak. V 288) [Pluhar: "How are synthetic cognitive 
judgments possible a priori?" (CJ 152)] and ‘Wie sind synthetische Urtheile a priori mdglichT' (Ak. 
V 289) [Pluhar: "How are syntheticjudgments possible a priori?" (CJ 153)] 
Although Kant himself swings between several German words (including “Urteile’” “Satze,” 
“Erkenntnisse” and “Erkenntnifiurtheile”\ the term "a priori” is never used as an adjective modifying 
the above nouns. Instead, it is an adverb modifying the possibility of judging and knowing. Therefore, 
Smith's translations, which treat the term “a priori” as an adjective in parallel with the adjective 
"synthetic," is obviously inaccurate. Pluhar, as the new translator of the Critique of Pure Reason and 
of the Critique of Judgment, together with Ellington, as the translator of Prolegomena, both recognize 
the proper part of speech of the term "a priori” without making the same mistake as Smith. Although 
Pluhar and Ellington also have difference in placing the adverb "a priori" (before or after the 
adjective "possible"), both locations of an adverb in a sentence are permissible in English grammar. 
Basing on the above clarifications, we shall adopt the translation by Pluhar and render the general 
problem of transcendental philosophy as: "How are synthetic judgments possible a priori?" (The idea 
of the above remark is contributed by my supervisor, Prof. Tze-wan Kwan, in a Kant lecture in the 
spring semester of 1995 and 1997 in The Chinese University of Hong Kong.) 
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(1791)，and it will certainly be fruitful for us to follow Kant's own steps so as to 
bring the problem into light. 
"The first step to be taken in this rational investigation is to make the general 
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments." (Prog. 63) In fact, the 
distinction of analytic and synthetic is not invented by Kant. Although it was not 
expressed in the same wordings, the distinction between the two could be traced back 
to, say, Leibniz，distinction between "truths of reason" and "truths of fact’，or to 
Hume's distinction between “relations of ideas" and "matters of fact.，，'。Nevertheless, 
the importance of Kant's distinction will not be dimmed by his not being the 
originator of the distinction. Kant himself believes that the distinction has not been 
clearly understood and consistently held by his predecessors; hence he has this 
seemingly strange remark: "... perhaps even the distinction between analytic and 
synthetic judgments, has not previously occurred to anyone." (B 19) Therefore, the 
momentous implications brought about by the distinction together with the very 
terminologies and formulation of the relevant discussions nowadays should be 
credited to Kant rather than his predecessors. 
According to Kant, analytic judgments (affirmative) are those judgments with 
the predicate already contained in the concept of subject; or in other words, they are 
“those in which the predicate's connection with the subject is thought by [thinking] 
identity.” (A 7 / B 10, my italics) On the contrary, synthetic judgments are judgments 
whose subject and predicate are “thought without identity.” This formulation is 
challenged by the modem logical positivists as being only valid for the subject-
� See Lewis White Beck, "Analytic and Synthetic Judgments before Kant," in his Essays on Kant and 
Hume, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978, pp. 80 - 100. 
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predicate judgments but not for other forms of judgments." However, these 
challengers have overlooked Kant's other formulation which can adequately account 
for the analyticity of other types of judgments. Kant maintains that the highest 
principle of all analytic judgments is the principle of contradiction. "For if a 
judgment is analytic, whether it be negative or affirmative, then its truth must always 
be cognizable sufficiently by reference to the principle of contradiction." (A 151 / B 
190) Therefore, the general formulation representing Kant's distinction should be 
that whenever the validity of a judgment can be determined merely by the principle 
of contradiction, it is analytic; otherwise, it is synthetic. 
Since the validity of an analytic judgment does not depend on any empirical 
conditions, it can legitimately claim the status of universality and necessity. 
However, this apodictic status of analytic judgment precisely misleads those 
rationalists to regard it as the only rational knowledge, and they even attempt to 
derive all knowledge by appealing to the principle of contradiction alone. "Thus the 
celebrated Wolff and his acute follower Baumgarten came to seek the proof of the 
principle of sufficient reason, which is clearly synthetic, in the principle of 
contradiction." (Prol. 17) In response to the error of the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition, 
Kant makes clear the point that since the validity of an analytic judgment is 
determined only by the principle of contradiction, it can at most clarify or explicate 
originally possessed knowledge but can never introduce any new cognitive content.'^ 
It is only the negative condition [conditio sine qua non] of all truth. On the contrary, 
“Some logical positivists challenge that Kant's formulation cannot account for the analyticity of 
those judgments not in the subject-predicate form, e.g., the analyticity of the following kind of 
proposition: "If A is a boy, then A is a boy." 
12 We should note that Kant does not equate the analytic judgment with tautology. "The identity ofthe 
concepts in analytic judgments can be either explicit {explicita) or non-explicit {implicita). In the first 
case the analytic propositions are tautological. ... Tautological propositions are empty virtualiter, or 
empty of consequences, for they are without value or use. The tautological proposition, Man is man, is 
of this sort, ... Propositions that are identical implicite, on the other hand, are not empty of 
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only by synthetic judgments can we extend our knowledge. The former is merely 
explicative, while only the latter is ampliative. Furthermore, the analytic judgment 
shows its more crucial limitation in the fact that “in terms of content no concepts can 
originate analytically.”（A 77 / B 103) That is to say, there would be no content for 
the analysis to function if there were no synthesis connecting various presentations 
'Vorstellungenf^ beforehand. Therefore, solving the possibility of synthetic 
judgments is for Kant the key to the problem of rational knowledge in general. 
Traditionally, as agreed by both the empiricists and rationalists and later by 
the logical positivists, synthetic judgments are only possible a posteriori, i.e., 
empirical. Kant himself, during his dogmatic slumber, might probably hold this 
position too. It is Hume's forceful challenge to the dogmatism that reminded Kant of 
the urgency of investigating the nature of human knowledge. The breakthrough 
appeared when Kant discovered that the realms of mathematics and natural sciences 
contain principles which are synthetic but can at the same time legitimately claim to 
be necessary and universal. With this discovery, Kant soon recognizes the key to the 
problem, and declares accordingly that "the second step consists solely in raising the 
question: How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" (Prog. 65) The primary 
task of the first Critique can thus be understood as attempting to justify the 
possibility of arriving a priori at synthetic judgments. 
Ifthis second step can be accomplished, the third one may be followed: "The 
third step is the problem: How is it possible to gain a priori cognition from synthetic 
consequences or fruitless, for they make clear the predicate that lay undeveloped {implicite) in the 
concept of the subject through development {explicatio)" (Logic 607) 
13 I follow the more recent way of translation to render the German word “Vorstellung” as 
"presentation," instead of "representation." The reason for this alteration is expressed in the 
translator's note 73 by Wemer Pluhar in the Critique of Pure Reason after B xvii. 
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judgments?，，(Prog. 65)^ ^ Founding on the justification of arriving a priori at 
synthetic judgments, philosophy could proceed to gain cognitions a priori and finally 
attain a complete system. According to Kant, the quest for attaining systematic unity 
and completeness is the essential nature of human reason. A system of rational 
cognitions is not a mere aggregate of propositions; instead, it can only be attained a 
priori by following reason's own principles. The third step expresses the plan to gain 
cognitions a priori and finally to attain a system. In the first Critique, Kant has 
already sketched out the plan for the system of rational cognitions, and then he has 
also contributed a part to the system in his later works, including at least the 
Metaphysical Foundation of Natural Science (1786) for the theoretical sphere and 
The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) for the practical sphere. 
With this preliminary exposition, we should be able to understand the reason 
for Kant to employ the above formulation for the general problem of transcendental 
philosophy. As a matter of fact, showing the possibility of arriving a priori at 
synthetic judgments is exactly the cornerstone of the whole program of Kant's 
transcendental philosophy and the key to the possibility of all rational knowledge. 
1.2. The Concept of Method 
After a preliminary exposition of the meaning and significance of Kant's 
project, we should proceed to deal with the method he employed to achieve this 
ambitious project. With what method can he carry out his Critique of Pure Reason? 
To secure the ground for rational knowledge as such, Kant's method of reasoning 
cannot be arbitrarily chosen and loosely structured, otherwise his Critique will tum 
out to be nothing more than mere opinion. As mentioned above, Kant himself does 
14 In this translation, the term “a priori" is wrongly rendered as an adjective (for details of this error, 
please refer to footnote 9 on page 10). The German origin is: “JVie ist aus synthetischen Urtheilen ein 
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not allow any opinion in philosophical reasoning. He certainly recognizes the 
outweighing importance of designing a proper method of reasoning for his Critique. 
Hence he spent a whole division called Transcendental Doctrine of Method and 
coined several methodological terms for the different methods he used. 
In order to evaluate the method Kant employed for his ambitious project and 
the conclusion thus arrived, we should first review Kant's concept of method and its 
various instances. Kant's concept of method can best be explicated by comparing it 
with the concept of manner. 
“All cognition, and a whole of cognition, must be in conformity with a 
rule. (Absence of rules is at the same time unreason.) But this rule is 
either that of manner (free) or that of method (compulsion).，，(Logic 630) 
And a more elaborated exposition can be found in the Critique of Judgment. 
"Whenever we convey our thoughts, there are two ways {modi) of 
arranging them, and one of these is called manner (modus aestheticus), 
the other method (modus logicus); the difference between these two is 
that the first has no standard other than the feeling that there is unity in 
the exhibition [of the thoughts], whereas the second follows in [all of] 
this determinate principles.” (CJ 187) 
Kant maintains that all cognition must be in conformity with rules. The rules 
can either be free or compulsive; the former is the rule of manner as legitimately 
employed in fine arts, while the latter is that of method. All our knowledge 
acquisition must be guided by a valid method. Therefore, the elucidation of method 
is the propaedeutic to any theoretical cognition. This explains why Kant holds his 
Critique to be “a treatise on the method." (B xxii) Besides this broad sense of 
“method,，’ we are more interested in the narrower sense, i.e., the method Kant 
employed in his Critique. 
Erkenntnifi a priori mdglich?" (Ak. XX 266) 
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Before proceeding to the method Kant employed in the Critique, it is 
indispensable for us to draw some notes on his classifications of methods. Among the 
various classifications,i5 what is significant to our investigation .is the distinction 
between the analytic and synthetic method and between the regressive and 
progressive method. Kant defines the two pairs of methods as follows: 
‘‘Analytic is opposed to synthetic method. The former begins with the 
conditioned and grounded and proceeds to principles (a principiatis ad 
principia), while the latter goes from principles to consequences or from 
the simple to the composite. The former could also be called regressive, 
as the latter could progressive.” (Logic 639) 
The meaning of analytic and synthetic employed by Kant as an attribute of 
method is obviously different from that of judgment. These dual meanings will easily 
lead us into confusion. Therefore, in this thesis, I decide to reformulate Kant's 
concept of analytic and synthetic method, in the hope of showing how this distinction 
can be related to the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgment. 
Actually, the genuine reason for this reformulation lies in the fact that I need 
an adequate expression to represent the distinction between the two different types of 
methods according to the ways how they relate premises and conclusions 
respectively. As an attribute ofjudgment, the meaning of"analytic" signifies that the 
connection between the subject and predicate of a judgment is thought by identity, 
while that of "synthetic" is thought without identity. Then, as an attribute of method, 
I now alter the term “analytic method" to mean the kind of method with the 
connection between premises and conclusion to be thought by identity, and similarly 
that of"synthetic method" to be thought without identity. That is to say, the paradigm 
15 In Kant's different works, especially in the Lectures on Logic, he has drawn some formal 
distinctions between the different methods, including the distinction between acroamatic and 
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of an analytic method is a syllogism or deduction in the field of formal logic (not 
Kant's metaphysical or transcendental deduction), and that of synthetic method is an 
induction or hypothetical argument. Since, for Kant the meaning of analytic and 
synthetic method is tantamount to that of regressive and progressive method 
respectively, I shall preserve the terms regressive and progressive method in their 
original meaning, namely, as analytic and synthetic method, without alteration. 
Moreover, the terms regressive and progressive method are more appropriate in 
bringing out Kant's conception of method as an inference from the conditioned to 
conditions or vice versa. 
1.3, The Concept of Transcendental Method 
In Kant's works, we encounter a number of methodological terms tailored for 
different theoretical settings, as, for instance, the metaphysical exposition and the 
transcendental exposition in the Aesthetic, the metaphysical deduction and the 
transcendental deduction in the Analytic, and the metaphysical construction^^ in the 
erotematic, artificial and natural, geographical and historical, scientific and popular, systematic and 
fragmentary, analytic and synthetic and regressive and progressive. 
16 This method is usually neglected by Kant scholars despite its significance in the field ofphilosophy 
of nature. "... I have deemed it necessary that from the pure part of natural science Q)hysica 
generalis), where metaphysical and mathematical constructions are accustomed to traverse one 
another, the metaphysical constructions, and with them also the principles of the construction of these 
metaphysical concepts (and hence the principles of the possibility of a mathematical doctrine of 
nature itself), be [separated and] presented in one system." (MF 10) 
However, it is debatable whether this method is a philosophical or mathematical method. 
Kant made a well-known distinction between philosophy and mathematics: “Philosophical cognition 
is rational cognition from concepts. Mathematical cognition is rational cognition from the 
construction of concepts." (A 713 / B 741) "Transcendental propositions can never be given through 
construction of concepts, but can be given only according to a priori concepts." (A 720 / B 748) For 
details about the distinction between philosophical and mathematical cognitions, please refer to 
Section 2.2.1.1 (Mathematical and Philosophical Method) on page 39f. 
According to this distinction, metaphysical construction employed in the Metaphysical 
Foundations ofNatural Science can hardly be counted as a philosophical method; rather it belongs to 
the mathematical sphere. This point is also confmned by Kant in the Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science: "Now, rational cognition through the construction of concepts is mathematical. A 
pure philosophy of natural in general, i.e., one that only investigates what constitutes the concept of a 
nature in general, may indeed be possible without mathematics; but a pure doctrine of nature 
concerning determinate natural things (doctrine of body [the doctrine in the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science] and doctrine of soul) is possible only by means of mathematics." 
(MF 7) 
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Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Among these methods, there lies a 
kind of argument which is consciously designed by Kant to suit his epoch-making 
project: here I am referring to what is known to modem Kant scholarship as 
“transcendental argument.” 
The term "transcendental argument" owes its meaning to Kant's very concept 
ofthe "transcendental" which is central to his Critical philosophy. 
"We must not call just any a priori cognition transcendental, but must call 
transcendental (i.e., conceming the a priori possibility or the a priori use 
of cognition) only that a priori cognition whereby we cognize that ——and 
how — certain presentations (intuitions or concepts) are applied, or are 
possible simply a prio.，’（A 56 / B 80-1) 
Primarily, Kant employs the term "transcendental" to signify a certain kind of 
a priori k n o w l e d g e . ” Transcendental knowledge is not just a sort of a priori 
knowledge as mathematics; rather, as a kind of a priori knowledge, it concerns the a 
priori possibility of arriving at such knowledge reflectively. Therefore, the subject 
matter of transcendental knowledge is nothing but precisely the mode of our 
knowledge of objects or the capacity ofknowledge itself. 
Nevertheless, some commentators argue that metaphysical construction is also a 
philosophical method and it is even very important to the transcendental philosophy. "The truly 
mechanical becomes the mathematical, which in tum is further articulated in the crucial aspect of 
'construction'. And 'construction' itself, from being initially located in the realm of mathematical 
operations, is generalized in the body of the ‘critical’ argument as the process of 'synthesis ‘ ofthe 
'empirical manifold’, i.e. of a process which operates on the material of sensation, our perceptions. In 
this way, 'synthesis', and with this ‘ construction'’ become transcendental elements.” Gerd Buchdahl, 
Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, Oxford: Blackwell, 1969，pp. 555f. Quoted from the 
chapter of Translator 's Introduction by Wolfgang Schwarz in Immanuel Kant, Logic, Robert S. 
Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz tr., New York: Dover, 1988, p. lxxxii. Actually, this problem is a 
very interesting topic, but owing to the limit of scope, we cannot discuss it in details here. Relevant 
discussions can be found in the above Translator 's Introduction. 
17 As we have already pointed out in footnote 9 on page 10 that Kant always uses the term "a priori" 
as an adverb rather than as an adjective. However, the term "a priori knowledge" is aknostajargon in 
the discussions ofKant's epistemology, and therefore it is very difficult to avoid using this term in the 
relevant discussions. The term “a priori knowledge" means a kind of non-empirical knowledge that 
can be attained a priori. Nevertheless, the nature of this peculiar kind of knowledge needs our further 
investigations. 
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“I call transcendental all cognition that deals not so much with objects as 
rather with our way of cognizing objects in general insofar as that way of 
cognizing is to be possible a priori." (A 11-2 / B 25)" 
When the term “transcendental，，is employed as an attribute of an argument, it 
denotes a kind of argument whose aim is to attain transcendental knowledge; in more 
precise terms, transcendental argument is a kind of argument that deals with our 
cognitive powers and the way we know objects so as to justify the possibility of 
arriving a priori at knowledge. Among the various methods employed and named by 
Kant, the most representative paradigm of a transcendental argument is certainly the 
transcendental deduction” The transcendental deduction employed in the first 
Critique^^ is to justify the objective validity of the categories so as to ground the 
possibility of arriving a priori at synthetic judgments. This task is the central 
objective of the first Critique and this deduction is also acknowledged as the very 
core of such investigation. Owing to the obscurity and complexity of the deduction, 
there have been many controversies among Kant scholars. 
18 This point is supported by most Kant scholars. Genova, for example, has distinguished four kinds of 
transcendental arguments, namely, the hypothetical deduction, the metaphysical deduction, the 
transcendental deduction and the transcendental refutation. He concludes that only the third one, the 
transcendental deduction, is the proper instance of a transcendental argument, while the others are 
only partially valid transcendental arguments. See A. C. Genova, "Kant's Notion of Transcendental 
Presupposition in the First Critique,” in J. N. Mohanty and Robert W. Shahan ed., Essays on Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982, p. 105. However, there are 
also a minority of commentators who do not hold the same position; for example, Graham Bird 
maintains that the Second Analogy and the Refutation of Idealism are better paradigms than the 
Transcendental Deduction. See Graham Bird, "Kant's Transcendental Arguments," in Eva Schaper 
and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl ed., Reading Kant: New Perspectives on Transcendental Arguments and 
CriticalPhilosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, pp. 21 — 39. 
19 The term "transcendental deduction" is also employed as characterizing the method of 
argumentation in the second and third Critiques and even in the Opus Postumum; but owing to their 
difference in objectives, they are quite different from each other. But anyway, the most important 
instance of a transcendental argument is above all the one formulated in the first Critique. For details 
about the transcendental deductions in the four books, see Eckart Forster ed., Kant's Transcendental 
Deductions: The Three Critiques and the Opus postumum, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989. 
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In this thesis, I shall mean, by the term "transcendental argument,"^® the kind 
of argument which deals with our cognitive powers and the way we know objects 
and the purpose of such an argument is nothing but to justify the possibility of 
rational knowledge. In this connection, I hold the "transcendental deduction" in the 
first Critique to be the legitimate paradigm of a transcendental argument. Besides, I 
signify, by the term "transcendental method" the method of reasoning constituting 
the transcendental argument. Since the primary objective of my thesis is not to 
analyze any particular instance of transcendental argument, but to examine and 
evaluate the general logical form, the theoretical status and the methodological 
consequences of transcendental argument, I have purposely chosen the more general 
term "transcendental method" in the title of research to represent my concern. 
Although I do not aim at a detailed examination of the transcendental deduction, I 
shall still refer to it for illustration purposes whenever necessary. Nevertheless, in 
order to avoid shifting my focus, I shall keep myself from engaging into the 
divergent controversies over the deduction. 
1.4, The Under-Thematized Problem 
In the last section, we have already clarified that the main concem of Kant's 
transcendental philosophy is to deal with the mode of our knowledge acquisition. 
The subject matter of transcendental philosophy is nothing but our cognitive power 
itself. For Kant, the clue to the possibility of arriving a priori at knowledge is to 
recognize the necessary structure and form of our knowledge. In this connection, the 
most crucial tasks of the first Critique are to discover the necessary conditions of 
2° Kant himself has never employed the term "transcendental argument," but indeed he sometimes 
uses the term "transcendental proof." Although nowadays we are more accustomed to call a 
philosophical reasoning an argument rather than a proof, Kant may not share the same custom with 
us. By the term "transcendental proof he means the argument or proof he employed in the Critique. 
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knowledge and then to justify their universal validity (objective reality). These tasks 
are carried out in the metaphysical deduction and transcendental deduction 
respectively. Here, Kant's general tactic is to ground the possibility of arriving a 
priori at knowledge of objects upon the capability of getting hold of the necessary 
conditions (categories) of our cognitive subject. But, how can we get hold of the 
conditions of our cognitive subject and our cognitive powers? This is the main 
concem of the second part of my thesis. By examining Kant's transcendental method 
with respect to his whole system, I shall attempt to argue that Kant's argument must 
be founded upon the presupposition that our cognitive faculty is capable of having a 
certain mode ofimmediate and non-empirical consciousness of its own activity. 
In my opinion, Kant's position seems to be quite ambiguous. In the chapter 
on Paralogisms and in his doctrine of inner sense, he holds that the knowing subject 
itself can only be known empirically as other objects: "we intuit ourselves only as we 
are inwardly affected.” (B 153) On the other hand, through the concepts of 
transcendental consciousness and transcendental reflection, he seems to allow a kind 
of immediate and non-empirical consciousness of our own cognitive powers. Owing 
to this ambiguous position and the insufficient discussion of the problem, I hold the 
problem of self-consciousness^^ as an indispensable but under-thematized^^ problem 
In this thesis, I generally regard two terms as synonymous and I shall use either of them according to 
the context. 
21 Actually, there are several English terms which seem appropriate to represent the problem I 
addressed, namely, “self-consciousness,” ''self-awareness," “self-knowledge” and “self-cognition.” 
The four terms can be paired up according to their meanings. The first two have similar meaning and 
correspond to the German word '"selbstbewufitsein" while the later correspond to the 
“selbsterkenntnis.” The problem I addressed in this thesis can be represented more appropriately by 
the former pair. Although both "self-consciousness" and "self-awareness" seem to signify a kind of 
confused and "feeling-like" apprehension of the self more than a kind of conceptual and structural 
apprehension, Kant explicitly distinguishes between the cognition of oneself and consciousness of 
oneself (see especially Section 3.3.2.2 [Consciousness versus Cognition] on page 105). According to 
Kant, cognition or knowledge requires both intuitions and concepts. As the intellectual intuition of 
oneself is explicitly denied by Kant, an immediate and non-empirical cognition of oneself is clearly 
inadmissible to him. Hence, instead of "self-cognition" or "self-knowledge," we take the term "self-
consciousness" as the theme. However, we should also note that the relationship between the two 
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in Kant's philosophy. The ambiguity of Kant's position over this problem is also 
confirmed by Norman Kemp Smith's comments. 
“The synthetic processes which in the subjective and objective 
deductions are proved to condition all experience may be interpreted 
either as conscious or as non-conscious activities, and may be ascribed 
either to the agency of the individual self or to noumenal conditions 
which fall outside the realm ofpossible definition."^^ 
In this thesis, I shall attempt to expose Kant's ambiguous position. By 
reviewing Kant's transcendental method, I shall attempt to argue that the structure 
and status of such a method will indispensably force Kant to allow a certain kind of 
immediate and non-empirical self-consciousness. Then, I shall proceed to tackle a 
number of seemingly contradictory passages from Kant's texts. By clarifying the 
nature of the problem and by drawing some distinctions on the confused concepts, I 
shall try to work out a more coherent interpretation ofKant's transcendental method 
and the problem of self-consciousness with respect to his whole system. 
pairs is not that simple as we have explained in this note. Their complicated relation is precisely one 
of the problems we have to investigate. 
22 By the word "under-thematized," I mean that the problem is insufficiently considered and 
ambiguously formulated. Although the word "under-thematized" is not quite an usual English word, I 
think the meaning ofit is obvious enough, and it is a very concise and informative word to express the 
characteristic of the problem. 
23 Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason, ‘ London: Macmillan, 
1930, p. 277，my italics. 
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2. KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD 
As for Kant's transcendental method, I shall begin with a negative elucidation 
so as to clarify Kant's position against some common misunderstandings. This will 
then be followed by a preliminary characterization of the general logical status and 
nature of the transcendental method. Then, we shall further illuminate it by reading 
Kant's own explication in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method. After that, we 
shall attempt to outline the most plausible structure of the transcendental argument 
together with an explication ofKant's concept of deduction. Finally, we have to lay 
bare the operative (or generative) foundation of the transcendental method and 
indicate the under-thematized problem accordingly. 
2,1, Negative Elucidation 
Before going into a detail analysis of the nature and status of Kant's 
transcendental method, it is necessary for us to clear off some common 
misunderstanding of Kant's method. This negative elucidation consists of two parts 
which guard the transcendental method against being interpreted as a hypothetical or 
an analytic method respectively. 
2.1.1. The Hypothetical Interpretation 
The first misinterpretation I am going to deal with is the interpretation of 
Kant's transcendental method as a hypothetical method like that of the natural 
sciences. This interpretation is put forward by a very influential Kant scholar, 
Norman Kemp Smith. The interpretation is clearly expressed in his A Commentary to 
Kant 's ‘Critique of Pure Reason，： 
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"Though the method employed in the Critique is entitled by Kant the 
'transcendental method，’ it is really identical in general character with the 
hypothetical method of the natural sciences. It proceeds by enquiring 
what conditions must be postulated in order that the admittedly given 
may be explained and accounted for. Starting from the given, it also 
submits its conclusions to confirmation by the given. Considered as a 
method, there is nothing metaphysical or high-flying about it save the 
”24 
name. 
In the field of natural sciences, a scientific theory is posited as a hypothesis 
and its validity is verified according to the coherence between the consequences of 
the hypothesis and the facts that are known or can be known empirically. Smith's 
interpretation sounds quite true at the first glance, since Kant's task is to justify the 
possibility of experience by laying bare its conditions. If these conditions could only 
be discovered and bejustified by empirical means as with the hypothetical method in 
empirical sciences, Smith's interpretation would have been correct. 
However, if we understand the nature of the problem Kant has to solve, we 
shall at once notice that a hypothetical method can never be sufficient for the task of 
transcendental philosophy. First of all, the validity of a hypothesis is preceded by the 
existing facts or facts that can be known empirically, and all hypothesis must be set 
up and revised according to them. As the validity of any hypothesis depends entirely 
on experience, the method, by its own nature, is empirical and a posteriori. This a 
posteriori method simply can do nothing to justify the possibility of arriving a priori 
at knowledge. With this preliminary consideration, it is already clear that Kant's 
transcendental method can never be hypothetical. 
24 Norman Kemp Smith, op. cit., pp. xxxvii - xxxviii. 
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According to Kant, the hypothetical method indeed has its own place in his 
transcendental philosophy where he even spends a chapter on it (in the Discipline of 
Pure Reason in Regard to Hypotheses). 
"But although in merely speculative questions of pure reason hypotheses 
have no place as bases for propositions, they are nonetheless quite 
permissible at least for just defending such propositions; i.e., they do 
have a place in reason's polemic use, although not in its dogmatic use. 
Now by defending I do not mean augmenting the bases of proof for one's 
assertion; I mean, rather, merely foiling the opponent's illusory insights 
that are intended to damage the proposition asserted by us." (A 776 / B 
804) 
For Kant, hypotheses can be used to defend “as weapons of war 一 not in 
order to base a right on them, but only in order to defend this right." (A 777 / B 805) 
That is to say, the hypothetical method is not a proper method for establishing any 
thesis, let alone to meet the strict requirement of the transcendental philosophy, but it 
is capable of defending a right (logical possibility) against other challenges. For a 
hypothesis can be constructed only if it is not logically self-contradictory. 
Here, I involve the discussion ofKant's view on the hypothetical method not 
because of its own interest or significance, rather I intend to show that Kant himself 
is conscious of the difference between his transcendental method and that of the 
hypothetical. His awareness of the very difference between the two can further be 
shown by the following passage. 
“As regards certainty, I have bound myself by my own verdict: that 
holding opinions is in no way permissible in this kind of study; and that 
whatever in it so much as resembles a hypothesis is contraband, which is 
not to be offered for sale at even the lowest price but must be confiscated 
as soon as it is discovered. For, any cognition that is to hold a priori 
proclaims on its own that it wants to be regarded as absolutely necessary. 
~ 25� 
Kant's Transcendental Method and Its Under-Thematized Problem By Chong-Fuk Lau 
So does, but much more so still, a determination of all pure a priori 
cognitions; for it is to be the standard and hence is itselfto be the [prime] 
example of all apodeictic (philosophical) certainty." (A xv) 
This point is of crucial importance to my argument. Since the interpretation 
of the transcendental method made by Smith, as an outstanding Kant scholar, is not 
groundless, he sees the seemingly unbridgeable gaps between the premises and 
conclusion in Kant's arguments. Smith thus infers that Kant's method is hypothetical 
in nature. But, as Kant himself is conscious of the strict requirement of its method, it 
is indispensable for us to first set aside the hypothetical interpretation and then 
follow Kant's own thought and attempt another interpretation. Since, in this section, 
we still have not entered any of Kant's concrete arguments, we can only refute 
Smith's interpretation by showing its inadequacy to Kant's global project. In short, 
what we can conclude in this section is: Kant's transcendental method cannot be a 
hypothetical method, but what it actually is should further be investigated. 
2.1.2. The Analytic Interpretation 
Another possible interpretation of the transcendental method is to compare it 
with the deductive argument in formal logic. Indeed, Kant's transcendental 
deduction, which constitutes the most central argument of the first Critique, often 
misleads us to equate it with the modem sense of deduction in formal logic?; 
However, I shall now attempt to argue that this is precisely another misinterpretation 
which is founded upon the misunderstanding of the logical status of Kant's 
arguments in general and the notion of the “conditions of possibility，， 
[Mdglichkeitsbedingungen] in particular. 
25 Nowadays, we are familiar with the sense of deduction in formal logic which derives the conclusion 
from the premises analytically. However, treating Kant's transcendental deduction as a moment of 
deduction in formal logic is certainly a serious misunderstanding. The sense of deduction employed 
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Nowadays, we are accustomed to regard a deduction as a kind of inference 
that proceeds analytically from premises to conclusion. As the conclusion of a 
deduction is already implicitly or explicitly contained in the premises, it cannot be 
false when all premises are true. Therefore, deduction is a syllogistic proof, or in our 
wordings, a kind of analytic method of which the connection between premises and 
conclusion is thought by identity. Although this usage of the term "deduction" should 
also be known to Kant, his usage is certainly different from it. If we assume that Kant 
intends to prove his theses, for instance, the objective reality of categories, by means 
of the deduction in the above sense, his arguments should be capable of being 
reformulated as a chain of syllogisms. This interpretation is held by a number of 
commentators, for example, by R. P. Wolff: 
"Can an argument be found in the Critique which ... advances by a 
rigorous deduction to the validity of the law of causation and the other 
principles of the Analogies? The answer, I believe, is yes."^^ 
However, this interpretation would face difficulties straight away. First ofall, 
as put by one of the leading Kant scholars, Dieter Henrich: “if we assume that Kant 
announces under the heading of 'deduction' a well-formed chain of syllogisms, we 
must arrive at a very unfavorable conclusion about his capability of carrying out such 
a program. ... if it is to be defined as a deduction on the basis of its correctness and, 
above all, its perspicuity as a chain of syllogisms, its failure to meet its own 
by Kant is different from the one we conceive now. We shall clarify Kant's meaning of deduction in 
latter sections. See especially Section 2.2.3 (Kant's Program ofDeduction) on page 63f. 
26 R. P. Wolff, Kant's Theory ofMental Activity: A Commentary on the Transcendental Analytic ofthe 
Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963，p. 56. In this passage, the fact 
thjat Wolff employs the meaning of "deduction" in the sense of syllogism can be proved by the 
context. For example, in p. 45: "The synthetic or progressive method ... is simply the familiar 
deduction of conclusions from premises. It proceeds according to the canons oflogic, which in Kant's 
day meant the laws of the syllogisms." 
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standards would be completely obvious."^^ Henrich,s remark does not deny the 
existence of valid syllogisms in Kant's arguments. To be sure, Kant's arguments 
contain a number of valid syllogisms, but what Henrich tells us is that the whole 
series ofarguments could not be reformulated as an unbroken chain ofsyllogism. 
Nevertheless, even if we set aside the question whether Kant's deduction 
could be successfully reformulated as a chain of syllogisms, interpreting Kant's 
deduction in the modem sense of deduction would suffer from a more fatal defeat. 
Since the truth of the conclusion of any deduction hangs entirely on that of the 
premises, the truth of the premises is yet another crucial problem besides the validity 
ofthe inference. With what premises could Kant's arguments begin? And how could 
the premises themselves be justified? Obviously, neither could Kant begin with a 
higher epistemic principle which itself finds no place of justification within Kant's 
system; nor could he begin with any particular instance of empirical facts which 
cannot legitimately infer the required universality and necessity. Therefore, 
interpreting Kant's transcendental argument as deduction in the modem sense would 
lead to a twofold difficulty: the argument is either deductively invalid, or it could be 
made deductively valid only by introducing unjustifiable premises. 
This dilemma forces many Kant scholars to rethink the logical structure of 
Kant's argument in the hope of distinguishing it from ordinary deduction and freeing 
it from the involved difficulties accordingly. An ordinary deduction can usually be 
read as "P implies Q" or “P entails Q,，，her  Q is the logical consequence of P. 
However, when we study the actual arguments put forward by Kant, we shall soon 
fmd out that instead of searching for the consequences, he intends to lay bare the 
27 Dieter Henrich, "Kant's Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First 
Critique,” in Eckart F6rster ed., Kant's Transcendental Deductions: The Three Critiques and the 
Opus postumum, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989，p. 31. 
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conditions of the possibility of experience. Therefore, his arguments should be read 
as “P presupposes Q" or “Q is a necessary condition ofP."^^ Certainly, this conforms 
better to Kant's own formulation, but we should proceed to question the logical 
status of this form of argument, and more specifically, the meaning of 
"presupposition" or "necessary condition." Actually, there are two kinds of relation 
between a condition and a consequence. The first kind denotes a logically necessary 
connection between the two. If the condition can be analytically extracted from the 
consequence, we may say that the former is the logical condition ofthe latter. 
However, when Kant attempts to prove the objective reality of categories as 
the necessary condition of the possibility of experience, he could not proceed by 
analyzing the concept of experience. It is because what he intends to prove is not the 
logical condition of the possibility of experience, rather it is the real condition ofthe 
possibility in question. The distinction between the logical and real condition can be 
introduced by first reviewing Kant's distinction between the logical and real 
possibility.29 Kant has distinguished this pair of concepts several times in the first 
Critique, and the clearest wordings appear in a footnote in The Ideal ofPure Reason. 
“A concept is always possible if it does not contradict itself. This is the 
logical mark of possibility, and by this mark the concept's object is 
distinguished from the nihil negativum. But the concept may nonetheless 
be an empty one if the objective reality of the synthesis whereby the 
concept is produced is not separately established. However ... 
establishing this reality rests always on principles of possible experience 
and not on the principle of analysis (the principle of contradiction). This 
28 Grounded on the "collective insight" of Gram, Crawford and Ruf, Genova has discussed the 
differences of the logical characteristics between "imply" (or "entail") and "presuppose" (or 
"necessary condition") in details. See A. C. Genova, "Kant's Notion ofTranscendental Presupposition 
in the First Critique," op. cit., pp. 107 - 8. 
29 Actually, the distinction between the logical and real possibility has been clearly drawn by 
Aristotle. For Aristotle's discussion of "logical possibility," please refer to his Metaphysics, A 12， 
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point is a warning that we must not from the logical possibility of 
concepts [Mdglichkeit der Begriffe (logische)] immediately infer the real 
possibility of things [Mdglichkeit derDinge (reale)]：' (A 597 / B 625，my 
italics)3o 
Here Kant clearly distinguishes the concept of real possibility from that of 
logical possibility. The logical possibility signifies a concept which is free from self-
contradiction, while the real possibility asserts the objective reality of a thing; the 
former can be proved by the principle of analysis (the law of contradiction), while the 
proof of the latter rests on the principles of possible experience. Then, what I mean 
by the real condition is the condition of the real possibility which cannot be proved 
by mere analysis of concept with the principle of contradiction. On the other hand, a 
logical condition is a condition without which the concept would be logically 
impossible, i.e., self-contradictory. Logical condition and logical possibility are the 
two sides of the same coin and they both can be proved by appealing to the principle 
of contradiction. The essential difference between these two types of conditions are 
recognized by Kant as early as 1763 when he published the article Attempt to 
introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy. In this article, the 
distinction is expressed by the pair of concept, the logical ground and the real 
ground. 
“I fully understand how a consequence is posited by a ground in 
accordance with the rule of identity: analysis of the concepts shows that 
the consequence is contained in the ground. ... But what I should dearly 
like to have distinctly explained to me, however, is how one thing issues 
1019 b23 一 30; while for that of "real possibility", please refer to his Poetics, IX，1451 b7 and De 
Interpretatione, XIII, 22b7 - 23a27. 
3° See also another passage: "In order for me to cognize an object I must be able to prove its [real] 
possibility (either from its actuality as attested by experience, or a priori by means of reason). But I 
can think whatever I want to, even if I am unable to commit myself to there being, in the sum of all 
[logical] possibilities, an object corresponding to the concept. All that is required in order for me to 
thin something is that I do not contradict myself, i.e., that my concept be a [logically] possible 
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from another thing, though not by means of the law ofidentity. The first 
kind of ground I call the logical ground [logischen Grund] for the 
relation of the ground to its consequence can be understood logically. In 
other words, it can be clearly understood by appeal to the law ofidentity. 
The second kind of ground, however, I call the real ground [Realgrund 
for this relation belongs, presumably, to my true concepts, but the manner 
ofthe relating can in no wise bejudged." fNeg. 239, my italics) 
The above passage makes clear the distinction between the logical and real 
ground, or in my words, the logical and real condition. The relation o f a ground to its 
consequence in the former case can be determined from the law of identity (or the 
law of contradiction), while it is not so in the latter case. This distinction is in fact 
very important to the development of Kant's philosophy. The recognition of the 
significance of real ground enables him to be relieved from the Leibniz-Wolffian 
tradition which takes the logical ground as the solely legitimate relation between 
ground and consequence and which believes that all our human knowledge can be 
deduced analytically from one ultimate principle?� Kant himself, in his earlier years, 
also recognizes the outweighing significance and the momentous implications of the 
distinction to his own philosophy: “1 have reflected upon the nature of our cognition 
with respect to our judgment concerning grounds and consequences, and one day I 
shall present a detailed account of the fruits o fmy reflections." pS[eg. 241) This "one 
day，，expected by Kant is very likely in 1781 when he publishes the Critique ofPure 
Reason?: 
thought. But I require something further in order to attribute objective reality to a concept (i.e., real 
possibility, as distinguished from the merely logical possibiIityjust mentioned)." (B xxvii, my bold) 
31 For details about how Kant criticizes and overcomes the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition, see Section 1.1 
(The General Problem ofTranscendental Philosophy) on page lOf. 
32 This remark is also confirmed by the translator of that article, David Walford: "The ‘one day’ 
tumed out to be fair in the future with the eventual appearance in 1781 of the Critique of Pure 
Reason：' Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, David Walford tr. and ed., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 442, translator's notes 56. 
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Therefore, before answering whether Kant's transcendental method is an 
analytic argument, we should first decide whether he intends to work out the logical 
condition or the real condition of the possibility of experience. The correct answer is 
obviously the latter when we consider the following two points. First, as explained 
before, the emphasis of the real ground and real possibility is what distinguishes Kant 
from the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition. Second, what Kant intends to prove by the 
transcendental deduction is the objective reality of the categories. He states explicitly 
in the preceding quotation (A 597 / B 625) that "this reality rests always on 
principles of possible experience and not on the principle of analysis." Thus, it 
should be obvious that the objective reality of categories is not the logical condition, 
but the real condition of the possibility of experience. 
Generally speaking, the key concept of Kant's philosophy, the condition of 
possibility [Mdglichkeitsbedingungen], can only make sense with reference to the 
real condition. Only when the commentators are confused by the amphibolous 
meaning of the "condition of possibility," will they believe that the conclusions of 
Kant's transcendental arguments can be analytically extracted from the premises. The 
conclusions put forward by Kant certainly go beyond the premises and can never be 
attained by mere linguistic analysis. Therefore, holding Kant's transcendental method 
as analytic, no matter from grounds to consequences (implication) or from 
consequences to grounds (presupposition), is a serious misinterpretation. 
Now we are ready to recognize that Kant's transcendental method is not 
analytic in nature. However, the real conditions of the possibility of experience 
cannot be discovered by any empirical means either, for this alternative has already 
been ruled out by us in the last section. Then, what kind of method is it? Let us 
borrow the comment ofT. E. Wilkerson as conclusion of this section and at the same 
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time as an introduction to the next. Wilkerson also argues against the analytic 
validity of transcendental deduction, but in the conclusion of his essay, he suggests 
that transcendental argument can only be interpreted as a synthetic argument. 
“If，I have claimed, the transcendental arguments are not analytic (and 
can be made analytic only by introducing transcendental premises) and if 
synthetic arguments are not admissible in philosophy, then most of the 
interesting and important philosophical discussions ... will cease 
abruptly. Philosophy will consist either of trivial conclusions derived 
from trivial premises, or spectacular conclusions derived from 
spectacular but unjustifiable (i.e., transcendental) premises.，，〗〗 
2.2, Positive Elucidation 
Following the above elucidation, Kant's transcendental method could be 
interpreted neither as a hypothetical nor an analytic method. But, other than the 
above two interpretations, is there a third alternative left? I think, as suggested by 
Wilkerson, the only possible interpretation is that the connection between the 
premises and conclusion of a transcendental argument is synthetic and yet grasped a 
priori. Nevertheless, this interpretation, though it should be correct, is hardly 
acceptable to the majority of Kant's commentators. Since within the region of 
philosophy, we generally only admit two types of inferences as legitimate arguments, 
namely induction (hypothetical) and deduction (analytic); the former only attains 
comparative and empirical universality, while the latter is the sole type of inference 
that can claim apodictic certainty legitimately. And unfortunately, the majority of 
Kant scholars tries to squeeze Kant's transcendental method into this prejudiced 
framework without paying enough attention to the peculiarity of his method. More 
33 T. E. WiUcerson, "Transcendental Arguments," in Philosophical Quarterly 20, 1970，p. 212, my 
italics. 
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fundamentally, the mistake made by the majority of Kant scholars does rest upon a 
serious misreading of the general problem of transcendental philosophy.�； This 
reading distracts many Kant scholars from the primary concem of Kant's 
transcendental philosophy. But this is a topic we have to discuss a while later. 
Kant's transcendental method is certainly neither deductive nor inductive; 
rather, it is synthetic and yet a priori. Nonetheless, there are some commentators who 
explicitly oppose our interpretation. Thus, before explicating Kant's transcendental 
method by making clear the primary concem ofhis transcendental philosophy, let us 
first review the points put forward by our opponents and disclose their error 
accordingly. Moltke Gram, for instance, has the following comment on the position 
we hold: "The assumption that there must be transcendental arguments because there 
are arguments which can be neither inductive nor deductive is a traditional obstacle 
to the solution of the problem."^^ Gram thinks that the solution to the problem is to 
recognize correctly the deductive form of the transcendental arguments. He rejects 
the alternative of interpreting the transcendental arguments as inductive simply 
because that kind of arguments could never attain the logical necessity which is the 
key requirement of a philosophical argument. According to Gram, those 
commentators who maintain transcendental arguments to be neither deductive nor 
inductive propound their interpretation by emphasizing the special status of the 
conclusion arrived by a transcendental argument. Although Gram himselfalso agrees 
that Kant intends to prove by a transcendental argument a conclusion which is 
synthetic and yet a priori. Gram suggests that his opponents err in holding that a 
34 "The connection between the premises and the conclusion of a (valid) transcendental argument 
seems to be synthetic and a priori." T. E. WiUcerson, "Transcendental Argument Revisited," in Kant-
Studien, 1975,p. 109. 
35 See footnote 9 on page 10. 
36 Moltke S. Gram, "Do Transcendental Arguments have a Future?" in Moltke S. Gram ed. & tr.， 
Kant: Disputed Questions, Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1984, p. 162, footnote 32. 
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synthetic and a priori conclusion can only be proved by an argument which is also 
synthetic and yet a priori. 
"Even if the relation between the fact that we experience something and 
certain necessary conditions of our experiencing what we do is synthetic, 
it does not follow that the argument showing this connection must be 
synthetic. The conclusion of an argument may be synthetic apriori., but 
this does not make the relation between the premisses and conclusion of 
such an argument synthetic."^^ 
The above quotation shows clearly the main point of Gram's criticism. Let us 
follow the argument of Gram and see at what conclusion he will arrive. Gram holds 
that the structure of a transcendental argument is simply deductive, and then he 
attempts to sort out the possible premises that suffice Kant's aim and yet will not 
make the argument circular or trivial. He does fmd a candidate which is satisfactory 
to him, but, I think, probably not to others. 
"We can infer a conclusion transcendentally whenever we can derive it 
from premisses describing the necessary conditions of our apprehension 
of the contents of experience or from certain characteristics of those 
contents themselves."^^ 
If we already have a set of premises “describing the necessary conditions of 
our apprehension of the contents of experience," do we still need an argument to 
prove the necessary conditions of the possibility of experience? An identical 
inference (an inference with the same premise and conclusion) is certain deductively 
valid, but it is altogether trivial and circular. How can we obtain that set ofpremises 
"describing the necessary conditions of our apprehension of the contents of 
experience"? And how can the premises themselves be justified? Here I see no point 
why Gram can satisfy with the above solution. 
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Besides Gram, W. H. Walsh also stands against the interpretation of"neither 
deductive nor inductive，” and maintains the transcendental argument to be 
straightforwardly deductive. Yet, his comment on the premises of Kant's 
transcendental argument isjust opposed to that of Gram. 
“It is, of course, a principle of elementary logic that a necessary 
conclusion can follow only from premises which are themselves all 
necessary. But this requirement is not met in the case of Kant's 
transcendental proofs."^^ 
Basing on the form of a syllogism, Walsh argues that neither the major nor 
the minor premise of Kant's transcendental argument could legitimately claim the 
required necessity.^^ Both Gram and Walsh read Kant's transcendental argument as 
deductive, while their divergent conclusions confirm precisely the remark we drew in 
Section 2.1.2 (The Analytic Interpretation) that “the argument is either deductively 
invalid, or it could be made deductively valid only by introducing unjustifiable 
premises." 
After illustrating the inadequacy of Gram and Walsh's interpretation, it is 
time to retum to their point of departure, i.e., to the ground of rejecting the 
interpretation as "neither deductive nor inductive." The difference between Gram and 
his opponents lies in the question whether a "synthetic a priori conclusion，，must be 
proved by a "synthetic a priori argument." However, the answer may be clarified 
easily if we review the formulation put forward by Kant. As we have discussed in a 
footnote in the Introduction (footnote 9 on page 10)，the general formulation of 
Kant's transcendental philosophy should be read as “how are synthetic judgments a 
''lbid. 
38 Ibid. p. 165. 
39 w . H. Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1975. p. 
102. 
'° See ibid., pp. 102-4 . 
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priori possible?,，instead of "how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" The 
often used phase "synthetic a priorr misleads us to regard the two term “synthetic，， 
and "apriori” as two parallel adjectives qualifying the noun “judgments.，， 
This misreading distract us from the primary concem of Kant's 
transcendental philosophy. Kant does not intend to begin with some sort of 
propositions which is "synthetic a priori’” and then deduce therefrom the "synthetic 
a priori” conclusion. Instead, Kant's intention is to ask how we could arrive a priori 
at some synthetic judgments. The term “a priori” used primarily as an adverb 
pertains to the activity of arriving at certain judgments. Although it is still legitimate 
to talk about "synthetic a jc>nonjudgments," the fact that Kant's primary concem lies 
in questioning the mode of judging [Beurteilungsart] or of knowledge acquisition is 
something we should not lose sight of. Hence, we should not reduce Kant's concem 
to the mere property of a special kind of proposition and neglect the way of 
argumentation. In fact, the mode of arriving a priori at a synthetic judgment and the 
judgment which can be called synthetic a priori are two sides ofthe same coin. The 
possibility of either side cannot be solved without taking the other into consideration. 
After reconsidering the above peculiarity of the general problem of 
transcendental philosophy, we should be able to recognize the genuine character of 
Kant's transcendental method. If we follow Gram and Walsh to read Kant's 
argument as deductive that begins with a set of “synthetic a priori premises" and 
ends straightforwardly with a "synthetic a priori conclusion," we miss precisely the 
key question that Kant would undoubtedly ask, i.e., how could we arrive a priori at 
those synthetic premises? The possibility of arriving a priori at the synthetic 
premises itself should also be covered in the scope of his transcendental inquiry. 
Therefore, Kant's transcendental argument, which aims atjustifying the possibility of 
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arriving a priori at synthetic judgments, is itself an attempt to arrive a priori at 
synthetic judgment. This self-referential character shows the tightly reciprocal 
relation between the validity of his purported conclusions and of the supporting 
arguments. In short, transcendental argument is for one thing synthetic and it 
proceeds a priori for another. Only by returning to Kant's own formulation of the 
problem could we appreciate the genuine nature ofhis transcendental method, while 
squeezing it into the traditional framework of deduction and induction will just miss 
the key to the problem. 
2.2.1. Illumination from the Doctrine of Method 
The above peculiarity of the transcendental method is certainly noticed by 
Kant himself. This awareness is also shown by the fact that he deliberately divides 
the Critique into the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements and the Transcendental 
Doctrine of Method. One of the major tasks of the latter is to explicate the nature and 
possibility of the proofs employed in the Critique. Kant's own account of the 
transcendental method in the Doctrine of Method, as I am going to show, on the one 
hand confirms the above elucidation we gave, and further illuminates the nature and 
possibility of this peculiar method on the other. One of the most important passages 
concerning our problem appears in the opening sentences of the section, The 
Discipline of Pure Reason in Regard to its Proofs. 
"Among all proofs of a synthetic a priori cognition, the proofs of 
transcendental synthetic propositions have the peculiarity that reason in 
their case must not tum straightforwardly to the object, but must first 
establish a priori the objective validity of their concepts and the 
possibility of these concepts' synthesis. This is by no means merely a 
needed rule of caution, but concerns the nature and possibility of the 
proofs themselves. I f I am to go a priori beyond the concept of an object, 
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then doing this is impossible without a special guide located outside of 
this concept. Thus in mathematics my synthesis is guided by a priori 
intuition, and hence all inferences can there be conducted directly by 
reference to pure intuition. In transcendental cognition, as long as such 
cognition deals merely with concepts of understanding, this outside 
guideline is possible experience.” (A 782-3 / B 810-1, my italics) 
The above passage states clearly that the proofs in the Critique have to "go a 
priori beyond the concept of an object,’，i.e., to be synthetic and yet a priori. These 
explicit wordings on the one hand confirm once more the above interpretation we 
gave to the transcendental method, and on the other hand reveal the need to explicate 
the nature and to lay bare the possibility of the proofs themselves in additional to a 
mere rule of caution in ordinary proofs. As the proof has to go a priori beyond the 
beginning concept, the conclusion cannot be arrived by the mere analysis of it; rather, 
a special guidance is needed. The appropriate guidance for the desired proof depends 
on the type ofproof. According to Kant, there are two types of proofs ofthe synthetic 
a priori cognition, namely, the mathematical and the philosophical. The essential 
difference between the two does not rest on their matter or objects, but on their form. 
(A 714 / B 742) A brief review on the formal difference between the two will 
certainly be fruitful to our investigation of the transcendental (philosophical) method. 
2,2,lJ, Mathematical and Philosophical Method 
It is a common belief by the rationalists that mathematics is the splendid 
example of successfully establishing rational knowledge without relying on 
experience. This apparent advantage leads many a sophisticated mind to imitate the 
mathematical method in the realm of philosophy. This trend is demonstrated to the 
utmost by Spinoza when he establishes his philosophical edifice by using exactly the 
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same method as that of Euclidean geometry/^ Unfortunately, Kant tells us that 
mathematical method, no matter how promising it is, cannot be modified for the field 
of philosophy because of their fundamental difference. This major difference is 
concisely expressed in the often-quoted passage: 
“Philosophical cognition is rational cognition from concepts. 
Mathematical cognition is rational cognition from the construction of 
concepts. But to construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the 
intuition corresponding to it. ... Hence philosophical cognition 
contemplates the particular only in the universal. Mathematical cognition, 
on the other hand, contemplates the universal in the particular, and indeed 
even in the individual." (A 713-4 / B 741-2) 
The slightly verbal differences between philosophical and mathematical 
cognitions reveal the fundamental divergence between the two kinds of proofs. 
Nevertheless, we should first note that when Kant characterizes mathematical 
cognition as cognition from the construction of concepts, he does not mean that every 
mathematical cognition is proved by the construction of concepts. Certainly, there are 
deductive or analytic inferences in mathematical proofs which proceed with the 
analysis of concepts. However, these analytic inferences should ultimately be based 
upon the synthetic definitions and axioms. As the connections between the subject 
and predicate in the mathematical definitions and axioms are synthetic, they need to 
justify their claim for universal validity. Kant suggests that the universal validity of 
these synthetic definitions and axioms are grounded upon the construction of 
concepts in the a priori intuition，: 
41 See Benedictus de Spinoza, A Spinoza Reader: the Ethics and other Works, Edwin Curley tr., 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
42 In this section, our main concem is not Kant's philosophy of mathematics, rather we want to clarify 
the philosophical method by comparing it with the mathematical. Therefore, we shall neither discuss 
the validity of Kant's conception of mathematics, nor engage in the widespread dispute between 
intuitionism and formalism. For details about Kant's conception of mathematics, see Jaakko Hintikka, 
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By construction, Kant means the transition from a general concept to the 
corresponding intuition, and the transition can be proceeded a priori if it is 
independent of experience. In a mathematical judgment, the basis of the a priori 
connection between the subject and predicate is the constructibility ofthe concepts in 
a priori intuition, thus mathematics has the freedom to create (construct) its own 
objects of cognition provided that they can be exhibited a priori in intuition. Now, 
since no intuition can be given a priori except the mere form of appearances, i.e., 
space and time, and all possible intuitions must conform to the form of appearance, 
all possible intuitions must then conform to the constructed concepts in the a priori 
intuition. Therefore, it is legitimate for a mathematician to construct a perfect circle 
in the pure form of space so as to study its properties, even if the perfect circle may 
not be found in our empirical world. The universally valid properties of a circle are 
apprehended through the particular circle we exhibited in the a priori intuition. 
Although the mathematical method succeeds in its own realm, it can never be 
transported to the realm of philosophy. Instead of being cognition from the 
construction ofconcepts, philosophy is the rational cognition from concepts. There is 
no a priori intuition available to serve as an apodictic basis for the connection 
between the subject and predicate in a philosophical judgment, for instance, the 
question whether every event has its cause cannot be settled by constructing an 
example in intuition. In contrast to the intuitive nature of mathematical cognition, 
philosophical cognition by its own nature is discursive and it must follow the 
concepts which are given to the understanding empirically or a priori. As a result, it 
is not legitimate for a philosopher to construct his own world and study everything in 
it accordingly. Philosophers cannot define a concept or lay down an axiom according 
"Kant on Mathematical Method," in Lewis W. Beck ed., Kant Studies Today, La Salle, Illinois: Open 
~ 41� 
Kant's Transcendental Method and Its Under-Thematized Problem By Chong-Fuk Lau 
to his own wish, instead they must first establish the objective validity of their 
concepts and also ground the possibility of these concepts' synthesis. That is to say, 
philosophy "must take the trouble to justify its right regarding them [a priori 
principles] by a thorough deduction.” (A 734 / B 762, my italics) 
The nature of this thorough deduction is exactly the theme of our research. 
Yet, what we are ready to apprehend now is only its peculiarities in contrast to that of 
the mathematical method as discussed above.^^ The deduction in Kant's sense is 
certainly not a deduction in the sense of formal logic, rather it is ajustification ofthe 
objective validity of the concepts in question. Although, according to Kant, both 
mathematical and transcendental methods are synthetic which need a special 
guidance for their proofs, the deduction of transcendental philosophy cannot be 
conducted by a demonstration which exhibits the concept a priori in intuition; 
instead, the only guidance is possible experience [mogliche Erfahrung]. 
2,2,1.2, The Guide of Possible Experience 
"In transcendental cognition, as long as such cognition deals merely with 
concepts of understanding, this outside guideline is possible experience. 
For the proofhere does not show that the given concept (e.g., the concept 
of what occurs) leads straightforwardly to another concept (that of a 
cause), because such a transition would be a leap that could not at all be 
justified; the proof shows, rather, that experience itself and hence the 
object of experience would be impossible without such a connection. 
Hence the proof had to indicate also the possibility of arriving 
synthetically and a priori at a certain cognition of things that was not 
contained in their concept." (A 783 / B 811’ my italics) 
Court, 1969’ pp. 117 — 40. 
43 For details about Kant's concept of deduction, see Section 2.2.3 (Kant's Program ofDeduction) on 
page 63f. 
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The above passage states clearly that "possible experience" is the only guide 
for transcendental method to arrive "synthetically and a priori at a certain cognition 
of things that was not contained in their concept." With a proof guided by the 
possible experience means to show experience itself would be impossible without 
such and such connection. That is to say, for instance, the categories of 
understanding can legitimately claim its objective reality or universal validity when 
they are shown to be the necessary conditions of the possibility of experience, i.e., 
without which experience would be impossible at all. 
But what does Kant mean by "experience," and more crucially, "possible 
experience"? The meaning and significance of “possible experience as the guide of 
transcendental method" would remain superficial if we do not make clear the above 
concepts accordingly. However, owing to the outweighing importance ofthe concept 
of experience in Kant's entire philosophy, the concept itself deserves a much more 
detailed exposition than the one we are going to undertake. What we are going to 
offer is only a concise exposition with the emphasis put on its significance to the 
transcendental method. 
One of the keys to the understanding of Kant's concept of experience is a 
historical recapitulation of the concept itself as developed in the westem 
philosophical tradition up to Kant. Unlike Hume or other empiricists who treat 
experience as mere aggregate of sensations or impressions, and unlike the 
rationalists, or more extremely, the Eleatics, who depict experience as the source of 
illusion, experience in Kant's mind is actually the cognition of objects. It is not 
merely an aggregate of sensation, but already a structurally connected and ordered 
presentation of objects. "Experience consists in the synthetic connection of 
appearances ft>erceptions) in consciousness, so far as this connection is necessary." 
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(Prol. 48) Experience consists of both matter (content) and form.^^ The manifold 
presented to our intuition is only the material aspect, while the formal aspect is the 
synthetic unity of the given manifold. "... without such synthesis, experience would 
not even be cognition, but would be rhapsody of perceptions.” (A 156 / B 195, my 
italics) The form and matter of experience are two inseparable but mutually 
irreducible aspects of one presentation. This concept of experience also stands 
together with his concept of cognition. He insists that thought and intuition are the 
two indispensable elements of cognition without either of which our cognitive 
activities would tum out to be either blind or empty.^^ 
This concept of experience takes an extremely important position in Kant's 
thought. Experience in Kant's sense is not only subjectively valid but also 
objectively valid to everybody.^^ By affirming the objective reality of experience, 
Kant dedicates himself the task of questioning its possibility. This central task is 
most explicitly expressed in the Preisschrift: “The highest task of transcendental 
philosophy is thus [to determine]: how is experience possible?” (Prog. 83，my italics) 
Actually, the affirmation of the possibility of experience is the point of departure of 
the whole transcendental philosophy. Unlike Descartes, Kant does not carry out a 
universal doubt that attempts to build his philosophy from the point of zero. Rather, 
he begins with the objective reality of experience and search for the conditions ofits 
possibility. The objective reality of experience itself does not need any external 
proofs, instead "the possibility of experience is what provides all our a priori 
44 "Experience contains two quite heterogeneous elements: viz., a matter for cognition, taken from the 
sense; and a certain/orw for ordering this matter, taken from the inner source of pure intuition and 
thought." (A 86 / B 118) 
45 "Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind." (A 51 / B 75) 
46 Consider the distinction between judgments ofperception and judgments ofexperience. See Prol. 41 
- 4 5 . 
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cognitions with objective reality.，，(A 156 / B 195/? Even i f the concepts could be 
originated a priori, but if it did not refer to any experience, it would be only the 
logical form of a concept, i.e., empty. Thus, experience is actually the criterion and 
reference point of any cognition that purport to claim any objective reality. 
This reference point of objective reality is at the same time the guide of any 
transcendental proofs. Since what Kant intend to prove is, for instance, the objective 
reality of the categories, and the objective reality of all cognition can only be 
established by referring to the possibility of experience, then apparently “this outside 
guideline [for transcendental cognition] is possible experienced In the current 
context, Kant simply uses the terms “possibility of experience" and "possible 
experience" in the same s e n s e , but the term "possible experience" may offer us 
further characterization about this guide. The term "possible experience" allows us to 
notice its difference with "actual experience." In a passage criticizing Hume, Kant 
clearly distinguishes between the two and argues that Hume's error rests on the 
confusion between them. 
“..• the act ofgoing outside the concept of a thing to possible experience, 
which is done a priori and amounts to the concept's objective reality, was 
confused by him [Hume] with the synthesis of the objects of actual 
experience ——a synthesis that is indeed always empirical." (A 766 / B 
794，my italics) 
According to Kant, a proof guided by “actual experience" is always 
empirical; it shows only the particular and contingent determination ofthe object, but 
not what it necessarily is. On the contrary, the term “possible experience" does not 
47 See also another passage which uses the term "possible experience" instead of "possibility of 
experience." "Possible experience is what alone can give reality to our concepts; without it any 
concept is only an idea devoid of tmth and of reference to an object." (A 489 / B 517) 
^¾. J. Paton's commentary confirms the synonymity of two terms: "The phrases 'possible 
experience' and 'possibility of experience' are thus treated as equivalent." H. J. Paton, Kant's 
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mean any single instance of experience that we encounter, but the formal structure of 
experience as a unified whole.^' This is also the sense of “possible” in the First 
Postulate ofEmpirical Thought.. "What agrees (in terms of intuition and concepts) 
with the formal conditions of experience is possible:, (A 218 / B 265) A proof 
guided by "possible experience" is thus not directed to the material content of any 
actual experience, but to the formal conditions that enables experience to be cognized 
by us. Since no experience can be contradictory to its formal conditions, the 
transcendental proofs as guided by possible experience is legitimate to claim for 
universality and necessity. For no experience can be presented otherwise. 
For Kant possible experience is actually the realm of all cognition that is 
available to us, but only to the extent that we are finite rational beings. In Kant's 
mind, experience is always experience for us, and the formal conditions of 
experience are accordingly the conditions that make experience possible for us. There 
may be other kind of cognitive beings, for example, God, who have other forms of 
experience. Therefore, the term "possible" in "possible experience" does not mean 
the logical possibility, and its conditions are not the conditions valid for all 
(logically) possible world. Accordingly, the possible experience for us is not 
necessarily the sole form of experience that can be presented to all cognitive beings. 
Basing on the above considerations, Kant admits that the point of departure of the 
whole transcendental philosophy 一 possible experience (for human beings) — is 
contingent. 
Metaphysic of Experience: A Commentary on the First Half of the Kritik der reinen Vemunft, 
London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1936, vol. II，p. 90. ‘ 
49 "There is only one experience, in which all perceptions are presented as being in thoroughgoing and 
law-govemed coherence .. • in which all forms of appearance and all relation of being or not-being 
occur; when we speak of different experiences, then these are merely so many perceptions 一 all such 
perceptions belonging to one and the same general experience." (A 110, my italics) 
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"But although reason does set up secure principles by means of concepts 
ofunderstanding, it does this not at all directly from concepts, but always 
only indirectly by referring these concepts to something entirely 
contingent, viz., to possible experience. And thus these principles are 
indeed apodeictically certain when this possible experience ... is 
presupposed; but in themselves (directly) they cannot even be cognized a 
priori." (A 737 / B 765) 
The possible experience always refers to the particular constitution of human 
beings, and thus it is not logically necessary. Therefore, we have to presuppose this 
possible experience so as to make the conclusion apodictic. But this is not an 
arbitrary presupposition which is chosen according to our own wish, rather it is just a 
limitation ofthe realm of cognition that is peculiar to us as finite rational beings. “If 
the limitation on a judgment is added . • • then the judgment holds unconditionally.，， 
(A 27 / B 43) The possible experience is presupposed in the sense that it is grounded 
as the underlying realm of discourse (as an horizon). The operative concepts, like the 
"objective reality" and "universal validity," could only make sense by referring to it. 
As a result, the objective reality of possible experience itself can have no external 
proof, actually it does not even need one. No external proof does not mean to be 
unjustified. It cannot be proved, but can be accounted for. The discovery of the 
necessary conditions of the possibility of experience is on the one hand the proof of 
the objective reality of categories, and on the other hand, an account for the 
possibility of experience itself. This explanation may lead us to regard Kant's proof 
as a vicious circle, but let us postpone provisionally this actually wrong sentence. 
The peculiar relation between what is presupposed and proved will be discussed in 
the later sections in more detail.^ ® While for the time being, what we have to 
5° See Rule IV of Section 2.2.1.3 (The Criteria of Transcendental Method) on page 48f and Section 
2.2.2 (The Structure ofSelf-Referentiality) on page 53f. 
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appreciate in this section is the crucial role of possible experience in Kant's 
transcendental proofs. 
Possible experience as to transcendental proofs is just tantamount to a priori 
intuition as to the mathematical, despite that the former is discursive while the latter 
is intuitive. The intuitive nature of mathematical proofs allows them to be immediate 
certain. The discursive nature of the transcendental (philosophical) makes the proofs 
more complicate. How could we know that such and such are the necessity 
conditions (real conditions) of the possibility of experience? Even after recognizing 
the guide of transcendental proof, we still have to explore the further characteristics 
and criteria of it. 
2.2,1,3, The Criteria of Transcendental Method 
In the section The Discipline of Pure Reason in Regard to its Proofs, Kant 
explicitly states three rules (or criteria) for transcendental proofs. Here I shall first 
extract their main contents and then give a concise exposition for them respectively. 
Rule I: "The first rule is this: not to attempt any transcendental proofs 
without first having deliberated on the questions, and justified 
ourselves on their account, whence we shall take the principles 
upon which we mean to build these proofs, and with what right we 
may expect from these principles the success of our causality." (A 
786/B814) 
What Rule I clarifies is the domain of validity of transcendental proofs. It 
indicates that the principles upon which the proofs are based should be that of 
understanding and the principles hold only for objects ofpossible experience. But if 
the principles from pure reason are taken as constitutive, they will become dialectic 
(illusory). The main point of this rule is again to clarify that the validity of 
transcendental proofs should remain in the field of possible experience, and hence 
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only the principles from understanding are adequate to it. Actually, this rule states 
nothing more than the exposition we gave in the last section, then let us proceed with 
the next rules. But I think it will make the rules more intelligible, if we reverse the 
order of presentation between Rule II and Rule IIL Let us first introduce the third 
rule. 
Rule III: "The third rule peculiar to pure reason if this reason is subjected to 
a discipline regarding transcendental proofs is this: that its proofs 
must never be apagogic but always ostensive.” (A 789 / B 817) 
An apagogic proof is a proof in the form of modus tollens, i.e., if anyone of 
the necessary consequences of a proposition is false, the starting proposition is also 
false. On the contrary, an ostensive proof is a proof in the form of modus ponens that 
proceeds by showing the proposition as the necessary consequences or conditions in 
every steps. “A direct or ostensive proof is, in every kind of cognition, a proof that 
combines with the conviction of the truth also insight into the source ofthis truth. An 
apagogic proof, on the other hand, can indeed produce certainty, but not 
comprehensibility of the truth regards its connection with the bases ofits possibility." 
(A 789-90 / B 817-8) In terms of certainty and evidence, the apagogic proofis in fact 
superior to the ostensive, since “contradiction always carries with it more clarity in 
the presentation than does the best connection, and thus comes closer to the intuitive 
character of a demonstration.” (A 790 / B 818, my italics) 
With this kind ofcertainty, the apagogic proofhas achieved very much in the 
field of mathematics and even in philosophy. However, in transcendental inquires, 
the employment of apagogic proof may err in “substituting the subjective [element] 
of our presentation for the objective." (A 791 / B 819) Obviously, by this criterion 
Kant intends to distinguish its own proofs from those dogmatic proofs as already 
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refuted in the Transcendental Dialectic. Since the concepts originated in pure reason 
may not be legitimate to claim its objective reality in possible experience, or we 
could say, the subjectively originated concepts may not be objectively real. Then, the 
applicability of the concept in the object is under suspicion, and consequently both 
the affirmative and negative determinations of the concept may be false. The most 
illustrative examples are undoubtedly those given in the Antinomy. For instance, as it 
is wrong to assume that the world of sense is given in itself in its totality, then it is 
altogether false to affirm that either it is finite or infinite. If we attempt to prove the 
world as finite by an apagogic proof which shows the self-contradictory of its being 
infinite, we may be cheated by the apparent certainty of the conclusion but without 
noticing the inadequacy of the proof. 
In order to free the transcendental proof from the possibility of this kind of 
error, the proof has to proceed directly and shows every steps to be the necessary 
consequence or condition of the starting proposition. This kind of proof alone attains 
the highest comprehensibility of the truth. Therefore, the transcendental proofhas to 
meet the demand of showing ostensively the necessary conditions of the possibility 
of experience. It cannot slip away from the difficult task of investigating the 
constitution of our form of experiencing so as to reveal the necessary condition ofits 
possibility and prove the objective reality of the categories accordingly. 
However, we should also be careful enough not to over-interpret the rule. 
Kant does not say that the apagogic proof is logically wrong and totally unfeasible in 
transcendental inquires. What is crucial is to be cautious enough not to fall into the 
above-mentioned subreption and to disclose the necessary conditions of the possible 
experience in the right track. Although the apagogic proof cannot take over the 
ostensive which proceeds directly to disclose the necessary conditions, owning to its 
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comparative easiness and certainty, it still has its place in philosophical arguments, at 
least, as an illustrative and auxiliary argument. Therefore, it is not strange that Kant 
himself uses a lot of apagogic proofs in the Critique, and to be noteworthy, in the 
Refutation ofIdealism. Kant is not contradicting the rule put forward by himself, but 
taking the advantage of each type of arguments in its suitable applications. The 
ostensive proof which shows directly the necessary conditions of the possibility of 
experience still occupies its central position in the crucial arguments of the Critique. 
The above explication should allow us to appreciate the seemingly strange 
rule presented below. 
Rule II: "The second peculiarity of transcendental proofs is this: that for 
every transcendental proposition only a single proof can be 
found..” (A 787/B815) 
Why is there only a single proof for every transcendental proposition? This 
seemingly strange rule is actually grounded upon the peculiarity of transcendental 
proofs. In the cases of mathematical proofs or empirical proofs in natural science, 
their bases are either pure or empirical intuition. Then, the proof may begin with 
different intuitions and follow different paths, still finally arrive at the same 
conclusion. "But any transcendental proposition starts merely from one concept, and 
states the synthetic condition of the object's possibility in accordance with this 
concept.，，（A 787 / B 815) As we have explained above, all transcendental proof is 
guided by the possible experience in the sense that the conclusion is to be proved to 
be the necessary conditions of the possibility of experience. Then, a transcendental 
proofhas to unfold the necessary conditions stepwise by an ostensive method. To be 
the necessary conditions of the possibility of experience means that without the very 
conditions experience would be impossibility at all. Therefore, those required 
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conditions should be the unique set of conditions that grounds the possibility of 
experience. There must be no possible alternative, otherwise those conditions could 
not claim to be necessary. 
Therefore, a transcendental proof is unique in the sense that the conclusion 
can only be reached by unfolding the unique set of necessary conditions of the 
possibility of experience. Again we have to be cautious enough not to over-interpret 
this rule. The uniqueness of transcendental proof does not restrict the ways of 
presentation or formulation of the proof to one single scheme or strategy. It allows 
the proof to have different formulations and expressions according to the intended 
emphases. Therefore, we should not naiVely think that Kant is violating his own 
criterion when he formulates two versions oftranscendental deduction in the first and 
second edition respectively. Not the unique way of presentation but the unique set of 
necessary conditions constitutes the uniqueness of transcendental proofs. 
With the above elucidation, we should have leamt some of the peculiarities of 
Kant's transcendental method. The above rules or criteria have already marked out a 
transcendental proof from some other kinds of proofs, especially the mathematical 
proofs. However, what makes it logically distinctive is not the above. Instead, there is 
a rule which is not explicitly spelt out as a rule like the above three, but it is this rule 
that characterizes the most distinctive feature of a transcendental proof. The rule is 
found in the section The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Dogmatic Use, and it is 
expressed in contrast with the characteristic of a mathematical proof.^^ 
Rule IV:A transcendental proof has a conclusion that "despite having to be 
proved, the proposition is called a principle rather than a theorem, 
because it has the special property of itself first making possible its 
51 I follow Gram to name it Rule IV. See Moltke Gram, "Do Transcendental Arguments have a 
Future?" op. cit., p. 136. 
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own basis of proof, viz., experience, and of always having to be 
presupposed in experience." (A 737 / B 765) 
According to Kant, the conclusion of a transcendental proof should not be 
called a theorem, since only those conclusions that can be analytically deduced from 
axioms deserve this name，i.e., just as that of mathematical proofs. On the contrary, 
the conclusion of a transcendental proof should be called a principle “because it has 
the special property of itself first making possible its own basis of proof." In a 
transcendental proof, the possibility of experience is first presupposed, and the 
conclusion cannot be arrived at without first grounding this presupposition. However, 
what is logically distinctive is that the presupposition itself would in tum be made 
possible by the very proof and the very conclusion. This bi-directional justification is 
precisely the logical distinctiveness of Kant's transcendental method. But, is it 
simply a vicious circle? The detailed elucidation of this peculiarity can only be 
carried out by reference to a key concept 一 self-referentiality. 
2.2.2. The Structure ofSelf-Referentiality 
The bi-directional justification of Kant's transcendental method may lead us 
to regard it as a vicious circle at the first glance, but this does not do justice to the 
logical structure of the method. We are accustomed to prove a proposition by 
conducting a syllogism from a set of premises. But, how can the set ofpremises itself 
be proved? We may need another syllogism with another set of premises. Then, 
where is the ultimate point of departure of the whole chain of syllogisms? Is there 
any secure basis whence we could establish the whole edifice of human knowledge? 
Descartes with his Archimedian point, cogito, and Leibniz with his concept of the 
perfection of God demonstrate two of the most ambitious projects in this direction. 
But, plainly this is not Kant's direction and ambition! Kant holds firmly that 
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philosophy cannot imitate the mathematical method which begins with self-evident 
axioms and whence the whole body of knowledge is constructed. "Now, since 
philosophy is merely the rational cognition according to concepts, there will be no 
principle to be found in it that deserves the name of an axiom.” (A 732 / B760, my 
italics) According to Kant, this way of constructing philosophical knowledge is not 
only unjustified, it also will probably end up with a mere figment. 
If there is no such an ultimate and secure foundation, only two alternatives 
are left for the model of philosophical knowledge: either it involves an infinite 
regress or it is to some extent circular. The former alternative seems in conformity 
with the requirement posited by pure reason, i.e., to search endlessly for the 
conditions. But as the regress can never be completed and presented in its totality, it 
shows rather the conflict with the demand of pure reason. What Kant adopts is 
instead a method which is in some sense circular. We should note that a circular 
method is not necessarily a vicious circle. Even, the circularity of human 
understanding is one of the most debated issues in contemporary philosophy. For 
instance, the hermeneutic circle put forward by the hermeneutic school indicates 
forcefully and adequately the necessary circularity of our u n d e r s t a n d i n g ^ 
Nevertheless, we may not need to engage in such a demanding discussion, in order to 
distinguish an admissible circular method from a vicious circle. Instead, we may 
render the circularity intelligible by a simple consideration. 
For example, let us consider how we can explain the meaning of a word. 
Obviously, what we would do is to construct a sentence consisting of other words in 
order to clarify the meaning. But then, how can we explain the meaning of those 
52 For example, see Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and method, Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. 
Marshall tr., New York: Continuum, 1994, esp. Part II: The Extension of the Question of Truth to 
Understanding in the Human Science, esp. pp. 171 — 329. 
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words appeared in the explanation? Obviously, we would do the above procedure 
once again. However, there does not exist any "axiomatic word" in our language that 
can serve as the ultimate foundation for all explanation. Just on the contrary, the 
meanings of words in our language reciprocally explain each other and form a very 
large w e b " The circularity of the explanation of the meaning of words does not 
make explanation tautological as that of a vicious circle, but rather it constitutes the 
very essence of our language. A circular explanation or justification should be 
admissible, if it is capable of making sense of the involved elements reciprocally. To 
this kind of circularity we may give a name that shows a more positive sense 一 self-
referentiality, Moreover, when we characterize Kant's transcendental method as 
circular or self-referential, we do not mean the conclusion ofhis argument is already 
contained in the premises, for we have already shown that the connection between 
premises and conclusion in Kant's argument is synthetic. This characterization 
indicates rather the structure of the reciprocal relation between the two sides of his 
argument. 
By the concept of self-referentiality, I intend not only to distinguish it from a 
kind of vicious circle, but also to further characterize the special way of reasoning 
employed by Kant. The characterization of the transcendental method by the concept 
of self-referentiality in this thesis owes its originality to Rildiger Bubner who, in his 
53 One may think that the meaning of a word is ultimately grounded upon the ostensive definition with 
reference to a concrete object, but one may also realize how naive this view is by reading 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
G. E. M. Anscombe tr., Oxford: Blackwell, 1958, esp. §1 - §64. 
54 I follow Riidiger Bubner to explicate Kant's transcendental argument by the concept of "self-
referentiality." Rudiger Bubner, in his essay "Kant, Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of 
Deduction" (in Review of Metaphysics 25, 1975), has a very illuminating elucidation of the 
transcendental argument by this concept. The details of his elucidation will be presented in later 
portion of this section. But it is my design, not that of Bubner, to locate the concept of self-
referentiality in the context of circularity, and I believe that this approach will be suitable to the nature 
of the problem. 
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essay "Kant, Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Deduction,"^^ gives a 
very illuminating elucidation of the structure of the transcendental argument by the 
concept of self-referentiality. The only argument that deserves the name of self-
referentiality is the one which must go back to the conditions ofits own operation in 
justifying a certain conclusion and consequently by which both of them will be made 
comprehensible. "In other words revealing the conditions for the possibilities of 
using certain concepts must simultaneously show such revelation is possible."^^ A 
self-referential argument is to some extent circular in the sense that the possibility of 
the operation of the argument not only has to be presupposed in the outset but also 
need to be accounted for in the sequel. 
Kant's transcendental method possessing the structure of self-referentiality is 
indicated first and above all by the very concept of "transcendental." We have 
already given a preliminary exposition of the concept of transcendental in the 
Introduction (Section 1.3: The Concept of Transcendental Method). By the term 
transcendental, Kant means “all cognition that deals not so much with objects as 
rather with our way ofcognizing objects in general insofar as that way of cognizing is 
to be possible a priorL” (A 11-2 / B 25，my italics) Plainly, transcendental cognition, 
by its nature attributed by Kant, is not an ordinary kind of cognition ofobjects, even 
it is possible a priori. Instead, it is a kind ofknowledge that is directed reflectively to 
the a priori possibility of knowing objects. The proper object of transcendental 
cognition is not any other things, but precisely our capability of cognition. This point 
is expressed clearly by Kant in the Prolegomena: “But the word ‘transcendental，， 
55 Riidiger Bubner, "Kant, Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Deduction," in op. cit., 
1975. 
56 Ibid., p. 460. 
� 5 6 � 
Kant's Transcendental Method and Its Under-Thematized Problem By Chong-Fuk Lau 
which for me never means a reference of our cognition to things, but only to our 
faculty of cognition:, (Prol. 37，my italics) 
This point is of crucial importance to the adequate understanding of Kant's 
philosophy in general and the concept of self-referentiality in particular. The self-
referential characteristic of the transcendental argument would be brought into light 
i fwe pay attention to the distinction between the transcendental knowledge and other 
kind of a priori knowledge. An elaborated explication on this point can be found in 
Bubner's essay: 
"The a priori nature of this type ofknowledge [geometry and Chomsky's 
generative grammar on the basis of innate idea], taken simply by itself, 
does not however make it into a transcendental type. For transcendental 
knowledge primarily focuses on the preconditions relevant for cognition. 
From these two considerations it follows that one should not talk of 
transcendentality if only an unspecified precondition for knowledge is at 
stake, nor if only some knowledge is meant which is independent of the 
empirical and consequently prior to all experience. According to Kant, 
only that knowledge is transcendental, in which knowledge is thematized 
concerning its specific possibilities. If this is true, then that knowledge 
which is called transcendental takes as its object, together with the 
general conditions of knowledge, the conditions of its own genesis and 
functioning:,^^ 
Obviously, the term “transcendental argument" denotes the kind of argument 
whose aim is to attain the transcendental knowledge. Owing to the peculiarity of 
transcendental knowledge, a transcendental argument should be a special kind of 
argument that deals with “the conditions of its own genesis and functioning" in 
additional to "the general conditions ofknowledge." It is because the argument itself 
is a cognitive activity, the possibility of making such investigation should be 
57 Ibid” pp. 461 - 2, my italics. 
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included in the domain of a transcendental inquiry. Therefore, to put it paradoxically 
but adequately, a transcendental argument thematizes the possibility of a priori 
knowledge in general as well as the possibility of its own inquiry in particular. 
Bubner summarizes the characteristic in short: “Self-referentiality characterizes the 
transcendental argument.,,^ 
The structure of self-referentiality is an essential characteristic of a 
transcendental argument, but to Kant's own transcendental argument, the structure of 
self-referentiality is essentially hooked up with the very core of transcendental 
philosophy, i.e., the possible experience. The crucial role of possible experience in 
Kant's transcendental philosophy is already apparent, and there is a circular or self-
referential argument hooking up with it can easily be shown by citing from Kant's 
own texts. Above all, Rule IV of transcendental method discussed above points 
straightway to this characteristic: “it has the special property of itself first making 
possible its own basis of proof, viz., experience, and of always having to be 
presupposed in experience." (A 737 / B 765) 
Even more, if we recall the highest task of transcendental philosophy Kant 
determined in Preisschrift,^^ and the guide of transcendental method he gave in 
Transcendental Doctrine of Method,^�we may even summarize the kemel of 
transcendental philosophy by an expression confirming the interpretation we made 
above: the highest task of Kant's transcendental philosophy is to justify how 
experience is possible by reference to the guide of the possible experience itself. 
Therefore, possible experience is at the same time the beginning and end of 
transcendental philosophy. Only when possible experience is presupposed can we 
58 ibid., p. 462. 
59 "The highest task of transcendental philosophy is thus [to determine]: how is experience possible?’’ 
(Prog. 83) 
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begin our transcendental inquiry, but only after the inquiry is completed can we 
arrive at an adequate account for the possibility of experience. The circularity (or, in 
our words, self-referentiality) ofKant's transcendental argument is also confirmed by 
Heidegger's interpretation ofKant as put forward in the book, What is a Thing? [Die 
Frage nach dem Ding: zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsatzen: 
Heidegger affirms that Kant's proof involves necessarily a circle which is rooted in 
the very essence of the subject matter 一 experience — itself. 
"The proof consists in showing that the principles of pure understanding 
are possible through that which they themselves make, through the nature 
of experience. This is an obvious circle, and indeed a necessary one. The 
principles are proved by recourse to that whose arising they make 
possible, because these propositions are to bring to light nothing else than 
this circularity itself; for this constitutes the essence of ejcperience^ 
The circularity or self-referentiality ofKant's transcendental argument shows 
clearly that the legitimation of the a priori knowledge cannot be derived from an 
absolute and ultimate principle. For having such a principle would find no place of 
justification in Kant's framework. Then, as Bubner points out correctly, there is only 
one way of legitimation open to Kant: "The legitimation of such knowledge without 
the aid of absolute principles is only possible as a demonstration of the lack of 
alternatives to that knowledge."^^ For instance, the objective reality of categories 
should be justified by proving that without which the possibility of experience and 
knowledge cannot be conceived at all. In this connection, the categories are proved to 
be the necessary conditions of our knowledge. But, to demonstrate the lack of 
alternatives does not mean to prove the logical impossibility of an alternative 
60 See Section 2.2.1.2 (The Guide of Possible Experience) on page 42. 
61 Martin Heidegger, What is a Thing?, W. B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch tr., Chicage: Henry 
Regnery Company, 1967. pp. 241 — 2’ my italics. 
62 Riidiger Bubner, "Kant, Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Deduction," op. cit., p. 463. 
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Structure ofexperiencing and cognition. That is to say, the proofdoes not proceed by 
appealing to the logical self-contradiction of conceiving an alternative. 
In fact, there is an example of alternative given by Kant himself, i.e., the 
mode of knowledge possessed by the infinite rational being, God. As an intellectus 
archetypus, God's thinking determines simultaneously the object's existence by an 
original intuition [intuitus originarius]. Consequently, the mode of knowledge of 
God is certainly different from ours which is limited to the given of sensible objects 
by an derivative intuition [intuitus derivativus].^^ However, Kant does not positively 
affirm the actuality of the alternative mode ofknowledge as possessed by God, rather 
the alternative is presented negatively in the sense that it serves as a limiting concept 
'Grenzbegriff] bounding up the field of possible experience as the legitimate realm of 
knowledge for u s ^ Nevertheless, this negative claim of the alternative form of 
knowledge is already enough to show the logical coherency of conceiving an 
alternative. 
Plainly, the lack of alternatives Kant intends to prove is always a lack of 
alternatives for us as finite rational beings.^^ The fundamental characteristics of our 
“Heidegger presents an excellent but debatable elucidation of the fundamental differences between 
the finite knowledge of human beings and the infinite knowledge of God in his controversial Kant-
book. See Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Richard Taft tr., Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1990, esp. Part II: Carrying out the Laying of the Groundfor Metaphysics, 
pp. 13-85 . 
64 For an illuminating exposition of the negative significance of the realm of noumenon and the 
intellectual intuition as possessed by God, one can refer to a Chinese essay by Prof. Tze-wan Kwan. 
See FPPV, pp. 23 - 71. (I use an abbreviation for all Chinese references here simply because I am 
using primarily an English text editor. The details of the book can be looked up in the section of 
bibliography [Chinese References on page 127] ofthis thesis.) 
65 Stephan Komer, in his celebrated essay, "The Impossibility ofTranscendental Deduction" (in Lewis 
White Beck ed., Kant Studies Today. Open Court: La Salle, 1969. pp. 230 - 244)，gives a quite 
forceful challenge to the possibility of Kant's transcendental argument. He argues that even if a 
transcendental argument can legitimately rule out a particular alternative, it cannot rule out all 
possible alternatives simply because we cannot consider and examine all of them. Accordingly, all 
transcendental arguments are defective because they all fail to provide a uniqueness-proof. In 
response to this challenge, we should first bear in mind that the uniqueness Kant intends to attain is 
not an absolute uniqueness that even rules out the possible mode of knowledge possessed by God. 
Firstly, the required uniqueness is always grounded upon the fundamental characteristics of the 
flnitude of our knowledge. Secondly, the impossibility of an alternative is not proved by considering 
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finite cognition should be affirmed beforehand so as to demonstrate the (actual) 
impossibility of having an alternative. But then, one may ask, how can we 
legitimately affirm the fundamental characteristics of our finite cognition? Is it 
simply a factual (or empirical) assertion gained by our observation? "Now," as 
Bubner suggested, "the argument of the transcendental type makes a decisive 
advance over the merely factual demonstration. The advance depends upon the 
logical movement of selfreferentiality，As we have made clear above, a self-
referential argument has the peculiarity to deal with the conditions of its own genesis 
and functioning in additional to the general conditions ofknowledge. This peculiarity 
shows itself to be relevant in advancing over a merely factual argument. 
What is crucial here is precisely the act of transcendental inquiry itself. When 
we attempt to question the form of our cognition, the questioning itself is not 
possible without first making use of certain fundamental elements of the form of our 
cognition and affirming their actuality accordingly. Since we cannot deny the act of 
questioning when we are engaging in the transcendental inquiry, the fundamental 
elements affirmed in accordance with the act of questioning is not merely a factual 
state of affairs, but a necessary presupposition of the possibility of our inquiry. 
Founded upon the affirmation of the fundamental elements, the argument can then 
proceed to show the impossibility ofhaving an alternative form ofknowledge which 
can be coherent with the fundamental affirmations. 
each of them one by one. On the contrary, it is proved by showing that the negation ofthe conditions 
cannot yield an coherent whole with the fundamental characteristics of our finite knowledge. 
This point is made explicitly by Eckart F6rster: "A transcendental argument, we have 
noticed, in order to establish a particular condition of knowledge or experience, proceeds by 
considering an alternative, that is, the negation of the condition, and subsequently demonstrates its 
intemal incoherence. Clearly, this exhausts the field of possible alternatives to this condition. For 
although one may perhaps imagine different philosophical positions or conceptions based on the 
negation of the original condition, this would not add the number of alternatives to it.” Eckart F6rster, 
"How are Transcendental Arguments Possible?" in Schaper, Eva and Wilhehn Vossenkuhl ed., 
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Let US take the contrast between finite and infinite knowledge as an 
illustration. The need o f a transcendental inquiry itself reveals first and above all the 
finitude of our knowledge. Apparently, an intellectus archetypus simply needs no 
such an inquiry. What stands as an object of God is created by his intellectual 
intuition and known to him in its totality and immediacy. Then, the question 
concerning the objective reality of his concepts makes no sense to him due to the 
essential characteristics of his mode of knowledge. Therefore, the act of a 
transcendental inquiry affirms simultaneously the fact that we are not an intellectus 
archetypus. From this example, we should be ready to recognize that the inquiry 
itselfcan only be made intelligible with respect to a certain form of experiencing and 
cognition. 
"The argument derives its force from a fact, that is, from the irrevocable 
givenness that every consideration of the possibility of understanding has 
to proceed through understanding and that the results of such a 
consideration have to satisfy the general structure ofknowledge."^^ 
Therefore, we may say, the inquiry itself is the strategic beginning of the 
circle ofthe transcendental philosophy. The inquiry itself opens up the way to affirm 
the possibility together with the fundamental characteristics of our experience. 
Followed by these affirmations, the argument proceeds to disclose the necessary 
conditions underlying the affirmed characteristics. As a result, the argument on the 
one hand proves the objective reality of certain concepts and principles sprung from 
our understanding, and on the other hand, it gives an adequate account for the 
possibility of experience and knowledge in general and the possibility of the very 
inquiry in particular. 
Reading Kant: New Perspectives on Transcendental Arguments and Critical Philosophy, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1989, p. 15. 
66 Rudiger Bubner, "Kant, Transcendental Arguments and the Problem ofDeduction," op. cit., p. 464. 
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We have put the focus of the above elucidation on the logical structure and 
general strategy of Kant's transcendental argument. Still, there are certainly many 
details awaiting our clarification. One may straightforwardly ask, which fundamental 
characteristics can we affirm simultaneously by the very act of the transcendental 
inquiry? And what is the model of this peculiar way of reasoning? With these 
questions on hand, we cannot refrain from going into Kant's program of deduction. 
2.2.3. Kant's Program ofDeduction 
Kant is certainly aware of the extreme complexity and difficulty of the 
problem. However, he has not tumed away from such a demanding task, but takes it 
up as a proper "duty of philosophy." The task of designing a proper argument 一 the 
deduction 一 may probably have occupied him most of the time during his twelve 
years ofsilence. One of the passages in the Preface of the first edition ofthe Critique 
expresses this situation fairly. 
“I know of no inquiries more important for exploring the power that we 
call understanding, and for determining at the same time the rules and 
bounds of its use, than those that I have undertaken in the second chapter 
of the Transcendental Analytic, under the title of Deduction of the Pure 
Concepts of Understanding. They are also the ones that have cost me the 
greatest effort 一 but, as I hope, an effort not unrewarded." (A xvi) 
As we have already made clear in the preceding sections the peculiar logical 
structure of a transcendental argument, this peculiarity makes it impossible to imitate 
any usual forms of philosophical arguments. This difficulty should have been thought 
over and over by Kant and eventually he discovered a kind of judicial procedure 
which is feasible to his special task. 
^'Ibid.,p. 465. 
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"When teachers of law talk about rights and claims, they distinguish in a 
legal action the question regarding what is legal (quid iuris) from the 
question concerning fact (quid facti), and they demand proofofboth. The 
first proof, which is to establish the right, or for that matter the legal 
entitlement, they call the deduction.” (A 84 / B 116) 
Not until comparatively recent years does our knowledge of the legal origin 
of Kant's transcendental deduction remain merely on the few words of the familiar 
passage cited above. We owe our current understanding of the legal deduction and its 
relation to the transcendental deduction to an important article written by Dieter 
Henrich (1989)，"Kant's Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background 
of the First Critique''^^ In our times, our first impression of the word "deduction" is 
certainly its sense in the formal logic as a syllogistic proof. Kant himself should also 
be familiar with this meaning of the term “deduction”，yet Henrich argues with 
documentary supports that "unlike now, this was not the only, and not the most 
common, usage in eighteenth-century academic l anguage . ’^ 
According to Henrich's findings, the legal origin of the tradition of 
"deduction writings" [Deduktionsschriften] can be traced back to the end of the 
fourteenth century, and it had became a widespread use at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century. These deduction writings were originated according to the 
specific historical environment of the Holy Roman Empire. At that times, there arose 
legal controversies over inheritance of territories or the legal succession in reigns 
among the independent members of the Empire. When these cases were brought to 
the Imperial Courts, which was universally recognized as an authority above the 
independent states, they needed a deduction to justify the controversial legal claims 
68 Dieter Henrich, "Kant's Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First 
Critique,” in Eckart F6rster ed., Kant 's Transcendental Deductions: The Three Critiques and the 
Opus postumum, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989, pp. 29 - 46. The following elucidation 
will extract some relevant materials from this essay, and for details one can refer directly to the essay. 
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over the disputed problems. Henrich has drawn some forceful evidences to show the 
fact that Kant was familiar with the practice of deduction writing in legal sphere and 
he actually borrowed this legal procedure to his transcendental inquiry. As the legal 
procedure was widespread in his times, he had good reason to assume that the 
transference of the judicial procedure to a philosophical one could be understood by 
his readers. Unfortunately, he could not foresee that such a widespread usage would 
tum out to become obsolete after the restructuring of the relation between the 
otherwise independent states because the Holy Roman Empire was abolished by 
Napoleon. What is more astonishing, to me at least, is that not until Henrich's recent 
article could none of the numerous Kant scholars unconceal this legal tradition 
adequately enough, so that we could have the proper direction to study Kant's 
deduction earlier. Even Henrich himself confesses that he had a wrong conception of 
the logical structure ofKant's transcendental deduction before the current discovery. 
"When I wrote the paper [‘The Proof Structure of the Transcendental 
Deduction'7o], I had no idea what a deduction consists in and took for 
granted that it was exhaustively defined as a chain of syllogisms. But it 
isn't, and after finding out that this is so, I must relativize what I said in 
that paper."^' 
Since the judicial procedure proves itself to be relevant to our study ofKant's 
program of deduction, it is indispensable for us to review the argumentative form of a 
judicial deduction so as to bring the philosophical one into light. The primary goal of 
a deduction is to justify the legitimacy ofthe possession of certain rights. However, 
not every kind of rights needs a deduction. If we divide the types of rights into innate 
(absolute) and acquired (hypothetical) rights, only the latter type needs a deduction. 
69/6zV/.,p.31. 
70 Dieter Henrich, "The Proof Structure ofthe Transcendental Deduction," in Ralph C. S. WaUcer ed., 
Kant on Pure Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 66 - 81. 
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Since the former is possessed by every human being just by virtue of their very 
nature, the rights need no further justification. On the contrary, the acquired or 
hypothetical rights have a particular origin that they are originated in a fact or an 
action. For instance, the right of being a citizen of a country can be legitimately 
claimed if the person in question was, in fact, bom in that country. Therefore, "in 
order to decide whether an acquired right is real or only presumption, one must 
legally trace the possession somebody claims back to its origin. ... by definition a 
deduction must refer to an origin^ This consideration makes intelligible the crucial 
role of the concept of origin in distinguishing the whole transcendental logic from 
the general one. 
"Such a logic [transcendental logic], moreover, would also deal with the 
origin of our cognitions of objects insofar as that origin cannot be 
attributed to the objects, whereas general logic has nothing to do with the 
origin of cognition. Rather, general logic examines presentations, 
whether these have their basic origin a priori in ourselves, or are given 
only empirically." (A 55-6 / B 80, my italics) 
Therefore, a transcendental deduction in transcendental logic has to discover 
and examine the real origin of our knowledge and derives therefrom the source of its 
legitimacy. Nonetheless, the investigation to the origin of our knowledge claims does 
not mean a task of describing the process of how we are in possession of certain 
knowledge. For this description can at most clarify the particular instance of how we 
arrive at a particular concept or knowledge, but it cannot justify the right of the 
knowledge claims or the universal validity of the concepts. The former approach of 
investigation, according to Kant, concerns solely a question of fact [quaesti facti], 
71 Dieter Henrich, "Kant's Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First 
Critique,” op. cit., footnote 4，p. 252. 
72 Ibid., p. 35, my italics. 
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which deserves at most the name of “the explanation of our possession of a pure 
cognition," (A 87 / B 119) but can never be called a deduction. 
Although both the question of fact and the question of right have to deal with 
the origin, but each in its particular way and only the latter is the proper question. As 
Henrich suggests, “to answer this question, one has to focus exclusively upon those 
aspects of the acquisition of an allegedly rightful possession by virtue of which a 
right has been bestowed, such that the possession has become a property."^^ 
Therefore, the crucial task of a transcendental deduction is not to describe the whole 
process of knowledge acquisition, rather it has to reveal and identify the crucial 
aspects of knowledge acquisition so as to justify the knowledge claims accordingly. 
Then, even if we do not have insights into the whole process of our knowledge 
acquisition and consequently the question of fact cannot be settled, the question of 
right can still be answered satisfactorily as long as the crucial aspects can be revealed 
and identified. Take the above example of citizenship as an illustration, we do not 
need to have every details concerning the autobiography of a person in order to 
justify the legitimacy of his citizenship. On the contrary, what is significant to the 
justification is the crucial aspect that originates the legitimacy of the claim. In this 
example, it may be the birthplace of the person or the citizenship of his/her parent, 
either of them alone is sufficient to the legitimation. 
From the judicial deduction as illuminated by Henrich, we can leam a very 
important characteristic of a deduction as such, i.e., "deduction can never be given 
without reference to the facts from which our knowledge originates.”?* Therefore, we 
should have an access to the crucial aspects in question. Put it in another way, a 
transcendental deduction could never be carried out if we were completely ignorant 
73 ibid., p. 36. 
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of the basic operations of our knowledge acquisition. More concretely, Kant's 
transcendental deduction given in the first Critique assumes the access to some basic 
features of our mode of cognition including, at least, the synthesis of apprehension, 
the synthesis of imagination and above all the synthetic unity of apperception. Only 
with reference to these origins could wejustify the right of our knowledge claims and 
the objective reality of categories. 
I fwe bring together the crucial role of the accessibility of origin indicated in 
this section and the self-referential structure expounded in the last section, we should 
be ready to grasp the general picture of Kant's transcendental deduction. The 
deduction itself as an inquiry towards the mode of cognition and our cognitive power 
reveals simultaneously some fundamental characteristics of the form of our 
experience and cognition. This revelation is possible only by grounding a way of 
access to the crucial aspects of the origin of our cognition. If the fundamental 
characteristics could be revealed and identified, our knowledge claims and the 
objective reality of categories could be justified accordingly. Furthermore, this 
justification will in tum serve as an account for the possibility of experience and 
cognition. Therefore, the accessibility of the origin of our cognition powers is the 
operative ground of the self-referential structure ofdeduction. 
Eventually, we encounter the crucial question underlying the very possibility 
of a transcendental deduction or even a transcendental argument in general, i.e., how 
can we access the origin of the subject matter? More specifically, how can we get 
hold of the synthetic unity of apperception? Is it accessible by means ofan empirical 
or a priori intuition as that of other objects? Or, is it accessible by a special kind of 
i”bid. ,p. 37. 
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consciousness other than any kinds of intuition? Henrich suggests that the only way 
open to Kant is by reflection. 
2.2.4. The Problem ofReflection 
Inherited from the problem indicated in the last section, we have to find a 
possible way of access to our cognitive activities in order to carry out a 
transcendental deduction. Provisionally, we may adopt the suggestion given by 
Henrich that the answer we are looking for is reflection. In order to justify the claim 
that reflection is the legitimate way of access to our cognitive activities, we should 
proceed to examine the nature and characteristics of reflection. 
Actually, the concept of "reflection" has gained new meanings and 
significance in the post-Kantian philosophy, yet we should stick our interpretation 
closely to Kant's texts in order to do justice to him. At the end of the whole 
Transcendental Analytic, Kant has given an Appendix, On the Amphiboly of 
Concepts of Reflection which arises through the Confusion of the Empirical with the 
Transcendental Use of Understanding. Although this appendix aims primarily at 
criticizing the main doctrines of Leibniz, it provides some important hints for us to 
understand Kant's concept of reflection. In the opening sentences of this chapter, 
Kant goes into the nature of reflection directly. 
Reflection “is our state of mind when we first set about to discover the 
subjective conditions under which [alone] we can arrive at concepts. It is 
our consciousness of the relation of given presentations to our various 
sources of cognition — the consciousness through which alone the 
relation of these presentations to one another can be determined 
correctly" (A 260 / B 316，my italics) 
The above passage tells us that reflection is closely related to the act of 
discovering the conditions of our cognition. Reflection is a consciousness. 
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Consciousness, by its own nature, is always consciousness of something. This 
something, in the case of reflection, is "the relation of given presentations to our 
various sources of cognition." When it is put in the context of our previous 
expositions, this short sentence reveals at once the crucial importance ofreflection to 
the transcendental deduction. Reflection is the consciousness through which alone 
the relation of different presentations to the source of our cognitive powers can be 
determined. Thus, reflection is the consciousness capable of revealing the crucial 
aspects of our cognitive activities. As the most fundamental task of the 
transcendental deduction is to identify and examine the origin of our cognition so as 
to justify our knowledge claims, Kant's exposition of the concept of reflection 
confirms our interpretation of the role of reflection. 
This interpretation of reflection lays a possible ground for a transcendental 
inquiry and makes the transcendental deduction possible. However, this 
interpretation obviously leads to new puzzles. Is reflection a kind of knowledge or 
cognition? Is it partial or complete, confused or distinct self-cognition? Is it subject 
to the categories and the form of sensibility? Or, is it completely different from any 
cognition ofobject? Put it in more general terms, what is the difference and relation 
between cognition (or knowledge) and consciousness (or awareness)? 
Above all, we have to explicate the meaning and significance of the 
characterization of reflection as a kind of consciousness. For, according to Kant, 
there are generally two types of consciousness, namely, the empirical and the 
intellectual (or transcendental or original). Following Kant's terminology, the first 
kind of consciousness obviously signifies the one hanging on empirical conditions 
and available to us by empirical means. On the contrary, the second kind points to the 
synthetic unity of apperception which is the necessary condition of the possibility of 
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experience. It is not empirically given, rather it is accessible to us immediately. Then, 
what kind of consciousness is reflection? Plainly, it could not be an empirical 
consciousness. For it is only a posteriori possible. Furthermore, the employment of 
the concept "transcendental reflection" (A 262 / B 319) by Kant indicates its 
theoretical status as an intellectual consciousness. The transcendental reflection as an 
intellectual consciousness is among the conditions that make experience possible, but 
not itself subject to the empirical conditions. 
However, what is the theoretical status of this kind of intellectual 
consciousness in Kant's framework? If we could gain insights into our cognitive 
activities by means of a sort of transcendental reflection, could we claim it to be a 
rational knowledge of the cognitive subject? Then, does it violate the criticism in the 
Paralogismsl This sort of questions forces us to further investigate the nature and 
status ofKant's concept of self-consciousness. 
2.3. Transition to the Under-Thematized Problem 
In the first part of my thesis, my primary objective is to elucidate Kant's 
transcendental method. In the outset, we have argued against two common 
misinterpretations, namely, the hypothetical and analytic interpretation. The 
hypothetical interpretation is not sustainable simply because the conclusion of a 
hypothetical argument could never fulfill the apodictic certainty required by Kant's 
project of transcendental philosophy. On the other hand, the analytic interpretation 
does not stand either. For the argument, if interpreted as deductive, is either 
deductively invalid, or it could be made deductively valid only by introducing 
unjustifiable premises. 
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After reviewing the two misinterpretations, we should be able to recognize 
that the logical status ofKant's method can only be made intelligible by putting it in 
the context of the general problem of transcendental philosophy. Kant has expressed 
the general problem of transcendental philosophy as: "how are synthetic judgments 
possible a prioriT This formula does not mean a program to derive analytically from 
a set of "synthetic a priori” premises to certain “synthetic a priori” conclusion. Just 
on the contrary, it indicates that Kant's concem lies in the problem concerning how 
we can arrive a priori at synthetic judgements. Therefore, Kant's transcendental 
argument should be interpreted as synthetic and as an attempt to arrive a priori at 
synthetic judgments. 
As the synthetic proofs in mathematics are guided by a priori intuition, the 
transcendental arguments have their own guide, namely, possible experience. The 
argument begins with affirming the possibility of experience and then reveals its 
necessary conditions. However, one should note that the conditions addressed are not 
the logical conditions which can be extracted analytically from the concept of 
experience; rather, they are the real conditions which make experience possible. 
Thus, the connection between the conditions and what is conditioned is again 
synthetic. 
Although Kant's argument begins with the affirmation of the possibility of 
experience, its possibility is not unjustifiably affirmed. Instead, the possibility is to 
be reflectively accounted for by the argument itself. Therefore, the argument, on the 
one hand, regresses from the possibility of experience to the objective reality of 
categories, but on the other hand, progresses from the necessary conditions to 
account for the possibility of experience. This bi-directional justification is actually a 
special kind of circle by which the two sides of the argument can be made 
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intelligible. We have a more positive name to this peculiar structure, i.e., self-
referentiality. The self-referential structure ofKant's transcendental argument has its 
strategic beginning at the act of investigation by which the fundamental 
characteristics ofour form ofknowledge are affirmed simultaneously. Consequently, 
the alternative forms ofknowledge are ruled out and the necessary conditions of the 
only possible form ofknowledge arejustified accordingly. 
Owing to the peculiarity in the logical structure of the transcendental 
argument, Kant borrows a kind of argument called deduction from judicial tradition, 
and hence he names his most central argument transcendental deduction. The crucial 
characteristic of a deduction is that it always attempts to justify the right of certain 
claims by tracing back to its origin. Therefore, this model of argument indicates the 
necessity of having an access to our cognitive activities so as to reach the origin. As 
suggested by Henrich, the only possible way of access suitable to the transcendental 
deduction is reflection. According to Kant, reflection is a consciousness of the 
relation of various presentations to the source of cognition. This consciousness seems 
adequate to the transcendental deduction at the first glance. But, what precisely is the 
nature of this consciousness? Is it empirical or non-empirical? Is it subject to the 
sensible conditions? Kemp Smith, in his Commentary, insists that there is no such an 
immediate and non-empirical awareness of our cognitive activities and what we are 
conscious of ourselves are always subject to the same conditions as that ofthe outer 
objects. 
"Consciousness, he [Kant] maintains, does not reveal itself, but only its 
object. In other words, there is no awareness of awareness. So far as our 
mental states and processes can be known at all, they are known in the 
same objective manner in which we apprehend existences in space. ... If 
there is no awareness of awareness, but only of meanings all of which are 
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objective, there can be no consciousness of the generative, synthetic 
processes [emphasis added] that constitute consciousness on its 
subjective sides.”” 
Smith's interpretation of consciousness is coherent with and even implies his 
own interpretation of the transcendental method. If there is no such an immediate 
awareness of our cognitive activities, we would have no immediate way of access to 
the origin of our cognition. Consequently, the necessity conditions of our experience 
and cognition could not be discovered non-empirically. As a result, Kant's 
transcendental method can only be hypothetical in the eyes of Smith. I f w e hold the 
same interpretation of consciousness as that of Smith, we should also concede to 
accept the hypothetical interpretation put forward by him. However, as we have made 
clear in the corresponding section, the hypothetical interpretation is not coherent with 
Kant's project of transcendental philosophy in general. If the transcendental 
argument were nothing more than a hypothesis, its conclusion would be nothing 
more than mere opinion. However, this alternative is ruled out at the very beginning. 
Thus, either we confess that Kant's project is incoherent, or we should proceed to 
explore how reflection can be an immediate and non-empirical consciousness of our 
cognitive activities without violating the basic positions adopted by Kant. 
Therefore, the task of the second part of my thesis is to explore Kant's 
concept of self-consciousness and to work out a sound interpretation of this concept 
with respect to the whole project ofhis transcendental philosophy. Provisionally, we 
may confess that Kant's position on this problem is vague and ambiguous. After 
recognizing this problem, we are going to explore the real position adopted by Kant 
and fix his position by distinguishing it from several misunderstandings. The under-
75 Norman Kemp Smith, op. cit., p. xliii. 
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thematization of the problem of self-consciousness (or self-knowledge) is also 
expressed in a comment by W. H. Walsh. 
"We must conclude that Kant has not sufficiently considered the sense in 
which some parts of philosophy seem to depend on our ascribing to 
reason a power ofself-awareness, in virtue of which it is able to discover 
truths about its own nature. He recognizes, indeed, as the passages we 
have quoted show, that logic is, in a broad sense, a form of self-
knowledge', and he should have seen that the same is true of critical 
philosophy itself. But his insistence on the important point that the self 
we illuminate in logic and theory of knowledge is really only the subject 
ofthinking, and therefore not a substantial entity, causes him to overlook 
the fact that, in assuming that reason can know itself at all, he is breaking 
with the main principle of his philosophy. In so far as this is true, we 
must admit that the Kantian philosophy is self-contradictory.”％ 
I agree with his position that "Kant has not sufficiently considered" the 
problem (in my words, it is under-thematized), but I cannot agree that the under-
thematization is rested on the self-contradiction of Kant's philosophy. Thus, our 
following task is to work out a coherent and sound re-interpretation of Kant's 
position on the problem of self-consciousness. 
76 W. H. Walsh, "Self-knowledge," in Ralph C. S. Walker ed., Kant on Pure Reason, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982. P. 164，my italics. Although Walsh himself has remarked that his views have 
changed since he wrote this paper, but I think, as agreed by the editor, Ralph WaUcer, the position he 
adopted in the paper is worth taking seriously regardless whether he has changed his view or not. For 
his more recent position, one can refer to his book, Kant 's Criticism of Metaphysics, op cit., esp. § 31 
—2, 42. 
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3. THE PROBLEM OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 
“ " . i n the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in 
general, and therefore in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I 
am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, 
but only that I am；，(B 157，my italicsf 
In my opinion, one could hardly find in Kant's transcendental philosophy any 
other doctrine which is more perplexing and ambiguous than his doctrine of self-
consciousness (apperception).78 The consciousness of “1” as I appear to myself 
pertains to the “1” revealed by inner sense, while the consciousness of “1” as I am in 
myself pertains to the “1” presumed in the rational psychology. Then, what does Kant 
mean by distinguishing the synthetic unity of apperception from both the above two? 
What does it mean by the consciousness of “1” as only that I am? Kant seems to 
distinguish the pure apperception from both the consciousness of the phenomenal and 
noumenal self. But, what is the proper location of this peculiar kind of consciousness 
in Kant's transcendental philosophy? Owing to the severe perplexity and ambiguity 
rooted in the problem, it leads to very diverging interpretations among Kant scholars. 
In the second part of this thesis, my primary objective is to attempt a most 
plausible settlement of Kant's position of self-consciousness. The purported 
interpretation should be coherent with Kant's philosophical position in general and 
his criticism on the rational psychology together with his doctrine of inner sense in 
77 This passage is quoted from Kemp Smith's translation rather than that of Pluhar. My supervisor, 
Prof. Tze-wan Kwan, suggested that Smith's translation of this passage is more faithful to the German 
original than the one offered by Pluhar. Compare Pluhar's translation: "In the transcendental synthesis 
of the manifold of presentations as such, and hence in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I 
am not conscious of myself as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but am conscious only that I 
am." (B 157) 
78 This is certainly not of my peculiar point of view. Many Kant scholars also fmd the doctrine of self-
consciousness or self-knowledge extremely obscure. For instance, the following comments are 
expressed by one of the most sympathetic Kant interpreters, H. J. Paton: "Unfortunately Kant's 
doctrine of self-knowledge is the most obscure and difficult part of his philosophy." H. J. Paton, The 
Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy, London: Hutchinson, 1958, p. 233. 
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particular. This attempt will be carried out by fixing the bewildering position adopted 
by Kant and by distinguishing it from liable misunderstandings. However, the 
elucidation we are going to set forth does not intend to be an exhaustive and 
systematic exposition of the doctrine of self-consciousness, for such a demanding 
project would require a lot more details than that we purport to undertake and it 
would also need a much longer discussion than the one we can afford. Therefore, our 
following elucidation will be guided by the problem inherited from the 
transcendental method and will examine only those aspects which are crucial for 
solving the addressed problem. Thus, the two parts of my thesis should be viewed as 
a unified whole which attempts an overall coherent interpretation of Kant's 
philosophy. 
The following exposition will begin with a very brief sketch of the views of 
previous philosophers on the same problem. This will be followed by a concise 
exposition ofKant's doctrine of inner sense and the criticism of rational psychology. 
This exposition will serve as a ground for the correct understanding of Kant's 
position on the problem of self-consciousness. Grounded upon the above preparation, 
we shall attempt to approach a coherent interpretation of Kant's doctrine of self-
consciousness and to settle his position with respect to his philosophy as a whole. 
The result of our exposition will also be checked by examining its adequacy towards 
the problem inherited from the transcendental method. Nevertheless, we may still 
anticipate the point that no matter how hard we have tried to make clear the problem, 
yet the problem of self-consciousness remains under-thematized by Kant. Thus, 
besides attempting a coherent interpretation without saying too much on behalf of 
Kant, what we could at best do is to point out the need of further exploration by 
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disclosing the under-thematized aspects of the problem and by suggesting a possible 
direction for further investigation. 
3. L A Brief Review of the History ofthe Problem 
The problem of self-consciousness certainly has a long history before Kant. 
However, it is not affordable for us to take up a review of the whole history of the 
problem, say, starting from the ancient Greeks. Instead, our propose is to give a 
minimum background for us to enter Kant's doctrine. Therefore, we shall only 
review the positions of some representatives of the two opposite traditions that 
influence Kant's position directly, i.e., that of the continental rationalists and of the 
British empiricists/^ 
Let us begin this brief review with Descartes' meditation. Since Descartes 
wishes to search for an Archimedian point as the absolutely indubitable foundation of 
the whole philosophical edifice, he carries out a universal doubt to test whether there 
is still anything left over. The result ofhis universal doubt is a commonplace: 
"So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude 
that this proposition, I am, I exists, [ego sum, ego existo] is necessarily 
true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.’，®。 
By the methodic doubt, Descartes puts forward the thesis that the existence of 
“1” as a thinking thing [res cogitans] is absolutely indubitable. Grounded upon the 
apodictic certainty of the existence of the subject, Descartes sets forth his project to 
derive some necessary truths about the self, including its substantiality, simplicity 
79 Thomas Powell, in the Introduction ofhis book, Kant 's Theory of Self-Consciousness, has presented 
a concise review of the positions of some representative philosophers before Kant, including 
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume and even Ryle (after Kant). Some of the materials I 
present here are also taken from this Introduction. See C. Thomas Powell, Kant's Theory of Self-
Consciousness, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990，pp. 1 - 10. 叨 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy: with Selections from the Objections and Replies, 
John Cottingham tr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 17. 
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and unity. The existence of‘T，is the highest point ofhis philosophical enterprise and 
this foundation cannot be proved by any empirical means. Rather, it is what we are 
immediately aware of. 
Leibniz, as a rationalist, inherits the general position of the Cartesian self and 
even extents it systematically to form a rational psychology. He maintains that the 
self is not given empirically but immediately accessible to itself by the acts of 
reflection. 
“By this knowledge of necessary truths and by the abstractions made 
possible through them, we also are raised to acts of reflection which 
enable us to think of the so-called self and to consider this or that to be in 
us. Thinking thus about ourselves, we think of being, substance, the 
simple and the composite, the immaterial, and even of God, conceiving 
what is limited in us as without limit in him. These acts of reflection 
fumish the principal objects of our reasoning."®^ 
That is to say, the nature of self is to be discovered by the immediate self-
consciousness and the further determinations can be made only by rational reasoning. 
Furthermore, Leibniz holds even a more extreme doctrine that the soul is what 
embraces the whole universe. Since external things cannot produce the concepts of 
their own determination, then only the power of thought as possessed by the soul is 
what actually contains the ground of their determination. Therefore, all truth 
concerning the self or the universe is actually already in our soul, but most of them 
remain in confused state and only a very tiny part is clear to u s 5 The system of 
81 G. W. Leibniz, Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays, Paul Schrecker and Anne Martin 
Schrecker tr., Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965, Monadology 30，p. 152. 
82 This is precisely Kant's own interpretation of Leibniz' doctrine. "There is something imposing and, 
it seems to me, profoundly true in this thought of Leibniz: the soul embraces the whole universe with 
its faculty of representation, though only infmitesimally tiny part of these representations is clear. It 
is, indeed, the case that concepts of every kind must have as the foundation on which alone they based 
the inner activity of our minds. External things may well contain the condition under which concepts 
present themselves in one way or another; but external things do not have the power actually to 
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rational psychology grounded upon the sole text of“I think" as developed by Leibniz 
and further elaborated by Christian Wolff is in fact the target of criticism of Kant's 
Paralogisms. 
On the other side of the Channel, Hume, who advances the British empiricist 
tradition as developed by Locke and Berkeley, maintains that we have no immediate 
self-consciousness, rather we can know ourselves only in the same way as we know 
other external things. What we have is a bundle of perceptions about ourselves. We 
“are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each 
other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement."^^ 
Consequently, the unity or identity of the self can neither be immediately aware of 
nor be rationally proved, but it is only supposed by our habitual association. As a 
result, the self in the empiricist tradition is no longer the ontological substance as 
depicted in the rationalist tradition; it loses its simplicity and is dispersed among a 
complex bundle of impressions. 
"For my [Hume's] part, when I enter most intimately into what I call 
myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, ... I 
never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can 
observe any thing but the perception. ... If any one upon serious and 
unprejudic'd reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must 
confess I can reason no longer with him. ... He may, perhaps, perceive 
something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself, tho' I am certain 
there is no such principle in me."^^ 
In a nutshell, the empiricists and rationalists present two contrary doctrines 
concerning our self-consciousness. The former admits only a sensuous perception of 
ourselves, while the latter grounds the necessary unity and existence of the selfby an 
produce those concepts. The power of thought possessed by the soul must contain the real grounds of 
all concepts, in so far as they are supposed to arise in a natural fashion with ht soul." (Neg. 237) 
83 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, p. 252, my italics. 
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immediate and non-empirical self-awareness. When the two conflicting doctrines 
come to the hands of Kant, he does not simply adopt either of them, but attempts to 
surmount their weaknesses and limitations. Kant's position of the problem is 
presented in his criticism of rational psychology and the doctrine of inner sense. 
3,2, Kant，s Explicit Doctrine of Self-Consciousness 
The opposite traditions of British empiricism and continental rationalism 
inherit two conflicting yet both unsatisfactory doctrines of self-consciousness. In 
order for Kant to overcome their specific defeats, Kant's position should be grounded 
upon a new framework which is capable of encompassing their respective merits 
without falling into the corresponding difficulties. The new framework I addressed is 
the general ontological thesis put forward by Kant 一 the so-called transcendental 
idealism. "By transcendental idealism of all appearances I mean the doctrinal system 
whereby we regard them, one and all, as mere presentations and not as things in 
themselves." (A 369) 
Undoubtedly, the doctrine of transcendental idealism plays almost the most 
crucial role in Kant's transcendental philosophy. It is only by distinguishing our 
objects ofknowledge from being regarded as things in themselves is it possible for us 
to arrive a priori at knowledge of them. What we have concerning objects are merely 
appearances which are subject to our form of intuition and then the synthetic unity of 
understanding. Therefore, what we could know, empirically or a priori, concerning 
objects are only what they appear to us, but not what they are in themselves. If an 
object is abstracted from our sensible conditions, we do not have the least knowledge 
concerning what it is in itself. Even more, a thing in itself might not be called an 
object in the proper sense. 
''Ibid. 
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This twofold distinction constitutes the underlying framework of Kant's 
philosophy. The distinction is either expressed as appearances versus things in 
themselves, or phenomena versus noumena.^^ The relationships and ontological 
status of the two realms are continuously under serious disputes since the times of 
Kant. The questions concerning whether the noumena or things in themselves really 
exist or not and what relationship they have to each other seem incapable of 
achieving comparatively universal assent. Fortunately, what we attempt to solve 
concerning the problem of self-consciousness does not demand us a dedicated 
commitment to either of the numerous possible positions. What we should do instead 
is to explicate, in the safest and most uncontroversial way, the general characteristics 
of the two realms so as to prepare for an introduction to Kant's view of self-
consciousness. In short, the realm of phenomena constitutes the sole legitimate 
objects of our knowledge and experience, while we could know nothing about 
noumena at all, no matter if it really exists or not. 
Generally speaking, we may regard that Kant distinguishes between the two 
aspects of self according to phenomenal-noumenal distinction. Among the various 
passages drawing the above distinction, I found one in the Preisschrift expressing 
Kant's points in the utmost clarity. 
“That I am conscious of myself is a thought that already contains a 
twofold self, the I as subject and the I as object. ... Absolutely no further 
knowledge regarding the I in the first sense (the subject of apperception) 
—the logical I，considered as an a priori representation — is possible, 
neither with respect to what sort of being it is nor [with regard to] its 
natural constitution. ... But the I in the second sense (as subject of 
perception), the psychological I，as empirical consciousness, is capable of 
85 The two pairs of concepts do have their difference. But as our propose is not a detailed exposition 
of them, we may simply take them as synonymous. For a concise exposition of their differences and 
relations, please refer to a Chinese essay by Tze-wan Kwan, op. cit., pp. 23 - 71. 
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providing] all sorts of cognition, and in regard to it the form of inner 
sense, time, is the a priori ground underlying all perceptions and their 
connection, whose apprehension {apprehensio) is the way the subject is 
thereby affected.，，(Prog. 73) 
According to Kant, the self can be regarded as either a subject or an object. 
The first is the logical I or the subject of apperception of which we have absolutely 
no knowledge concerning what sort of being it is and its natural constitution. The 
unknowability of this I leads us and many other commentators straightly to equate it 
with the noumenal self. However, this identification should be guarded under 
cautious consideration and restriction in order not to cover up the usually missed 
details. The another I is called the subject of perception, the psychological I or that of 
empirical consciousness. This I is the phenomenal self we encountered in the 
empirical world, i.e., the one which is subject to the natural laws and considered as a 
part of nature. This phenomenal self can be known in the similar way as other 
physical objects that it is subject to the form of sensibility and can only be known 
empirically. What constitutes the given of the phenomenal self is inner sense in the 
form of time produced by our inward affection. 
At the first glance, it seems that Kant adheres the empiricist tradition which 
allows only the empirical awareness of ourselves. But the truth is in fact not so 
simple. Therefore, we need to explore Kant's view on the two aspects of self 
respectively and merge the separated doctrines into a unified whole. Here we shall 
begin with his view of the phenomenal self by dealing with the doctrine of inner 
sense. 
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3.2.1. The Doctrine ofInner Sense 
The most common reading of Kant's doctrine of inner sense suffers from a 
serious defeat of being over-simplified and misleading, a defeat which conceals the 
profundity of the doctrine. This common reading treats the inner sense and outer 
sense exactly in parallel: the former is subject to the form of time with the soul as the 
object, while the latter is subject to the form of space with the physical things as 
objects. Although the two kinds of senses have many aspects in parallel, at least, they 
are both in the phenomenal (or empirical) level, but they do have many crucial 
dissimilarities. The doctrine of inner sense, if taken in its details, is without 
exaggeration "one of the most difficult aspects of the Critical Philosophy."^^ 
"Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuiting we do 
of ourselves and of our inner state. For time cannot be a determination of 
outer appearance, [because] it does not belong to any shape or position, 
etc., but rather determines the relation of presentations in our inner state." 
(A33/B49-50) 
The above passage is very clear in characterizing time as the form of inner 
sense. Temporality is the very nature of inner sense. For we could not even conceive 
any inner states that has no duration. On the contrary, the nature of outer appearance 
is not primarily characterized as temporal. Their primary qualities, say, shape or 
position, are not temporal, but spatial in nature. These contrasting characteristics 
constitute a twofold doctrine of nature, i.e., the doctrine of body and the doctrine of 
soul respectively.87 However, the outer appearance, though distinguished from inner 
86 Being one of the most sympathetic interpreters of Kant, Paton himself also finds the doctrine very 
obscure and difficult: "I feel far from confident that I have mastered this doctrine, and I am not sure 
whether my difficulties, are due to my own incapacity in following Kant's complicated expressions, 
or whether they are partly due to a real obscurity in his thought." H. J. Paton, Kant 's Metaphysic of 
Experience: A Commentary on the First Halfof the Kritik der reinen Vemunft, op. cit., vol. II，p. 387. 
87 However, according to Kant, the doctrine of soul cannot be established as a systematic science, 
"because mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense and their laws, unless 
one might want to take into consideration merely the law of continuity in the flow of this sense's 
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sense, finally has to become the determination of our mind so as to become our 
presentation. In this regard, it is also subject to the formal condition of inner sense, 
despite indirectly. "Therefore time is an a priori condition of all appearance 
generally: it is the direct condition of inner appearances (of our souls), and precisely 
thereby also, indirectly, a condition of outer appearances." (A 34 / B 50-1, my italics) 
Kant's position on time as the form of inner sense is so clearly and decisively 
expressed in various passages. This characterization yields no serious disputes 
concerning its interpretation and validity. However, his further characterizations of 
the nature of inner sense with respect to its object, the soul, and its affection are so 
obscure and complex that most of the Kant scholars fmd it very elusive. Now, we 
shall quote two puzzling passages which indicate the special nature of inner s ense , 
“ . . . the proper material in it, with which we occupy our mind, consist in 
presentations of outer sense.” (B 67) 
“By means of inner sense the mind intuits itself, or its inner state. 
Although inner sense provides no intuition of the soul itselfas an object, 
yet there is a determinate form under which alone [as condition] we can 
intuit the soul's inner state. [That form is time.]，，（A 22-3 / B 37, my 
italics) 
The first passage indicates a very perplexing point: what constitutes the 
proper materials of our mind are the presentations of outer sense. Then, does it mean 
that inner sense provides no material (manifold) at all? The second passage even 
declares that "inner sense provides no intuition of the soul itself as an object." 
Certainly, the "soul in itself，(noumenal) is not an object for us, but here Kant even 
internal changes." (MF 8) Therefore, the doctrine of body constitutes the sole proper doctrine of 
nature. 
88 In the following elucidation of the special nature of inner sense, I have taken some ideas and 
explications from two sources. (1) H. J. Paton, op. cit., esp. vol. I, pp. 99 - 101’ vol. II，387 — 425. (2) 
Henry Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1983, esp. p. 271. 
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denies that inner sense can provide us the intuition ofthe “soul itself, ( p h e n o m e n a l , 
as an object. How bewildering it is! 
Here I shall try my best to make the above passages intelligible. Let us begin 
with the second passage and see whether the first could thereby be made clear. Does 
inner sense provide no object? Actually, Kant's position should be: inner sense can 
provide no object in the strict sense. Kant should allow us to speak of the object of 
inner sense, but not in its strict sense. This strict sense of object means a determinate 
object or an object for cognition (or for knowledge). What makes the soul fails to 
form a determinate object is that its states are always in continual flux. 
"For in what we call soul, everything is in continual flux and there is 
nothing enduring, except perhaps (if one insists) the /; the I is so simple 
because this presentation, by having no content and hence no manifold, 
seems also to present, or 一 to put it better 一 to designate, a simple 
object." (A 381—2) 
In the empirical level, Kant's conception of the soul is very similar 
conception to that of Hume. A bundle of impressions and a continual flux of 
presentations both indicate the denial of an enduring soul. Furthermore, Kant in the 
Refutation of Idealism argues that precisely because nothing permanent can be found 
within us, the (empirical) consciousness of our own existence has to presuppose the 
consciousness of the existence of outer things. This point marks the crucial difference 
between inner and outer appearances. Those physical things, as exist in spatial form, 
always have certain presentations, say, certain figure or size, accompanying them so 
that we could identify them and apply the schema of substance (the permanence of 
the real in time) to them. However, since our inner states are always in continual 
89 By the "soul itself," Kant certainly means a phenomenal rather noumenal soul. There are at least 
two supporting reasons. First, when Kant intends to signify a noumenal object, he always uses the 
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flux, and no persistent presentations or anything permanent cannot be found as 
accompanying our soul, then we could not find anything corresponding to the schema 
of substance. As a result, the category of substance could have no application on it. 
Therefore, in this sense, our soul is not a determinate object as that of physical 
things. 
Then, can we still speak of the soul as an object? Certainly, we could find, 
among Kant's works, many passages characterizing our soul as an object. But that 
sense ofobject is certainly far from the one employed to signify physical things. The 
soul can also be presented as unified, simple and substantial. But this presentation is 
not grounded upon any intuitions or inner sense, rather it is presupposed by the 
necessary presentation of “I think" as accompanying all our presentations. However, 
this bare consciousness of “I think" is empty and it cannot be equated with an 
objective determination of the soul as an object. If we infer by the “I think" to the 
unity, simplicity and substantiality as the predicates of the soul as a real object, it 
wouldjust become a paralogism. The details of this criticism is to be explained in the 
next section, but provisionally we may say that the soul can only be presupposed as 
an object, but not encountered as an object. Or, in Henry Allison's words, it is a 
"subjective object.，’^  It is precisely this profound characterization that distinguishes 
Kant's conception of self from both of the empiricist and rationalist traditions. 
With the above preliminary explication, we may be ready to come back to 
another difficulty. When Kant asserts that outer sense is the proper material of our 
mind, he does not mean that inner sense has no manifold of its own, but it has no 
"proper" manifold which can be encountered as the presentations of the soul as a 
term "A in itself’ rather than "A itself." Second, the term "soul itself is used with its intuition and its 
inner sense. These two terms also indicate clearly that what Kant intends is a phenomenal object. 
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determinate object for cognition. According to this position, even the presentations of 
feelings, which certainly involve the manifold belonging to the soul, are not the 
“proper” material occupying our mind. The denial of any cognitive role of feelings as 
the determination of the soul is made explicit in a passage in the Critique of 
Judgment. 
"When [something determines the feeling of pleasure or displeasure and 
this] determination of that feeling is called sensation, this term means 
something quite different from what it means when I apply it to the 
presentation of a thing (through the senses, a receptivity that belongs to 
the cognitive power). For in the second case the presentation is referred 
to the object, but in the first it is referred solely to the subject and is not 
used for cognition at all, not even for that by which the subject cognizes 
himself." (CJ 4 7 f 
Now, we should have understood the crucial difference between outer and 
inner sense. The parallel treatment of them fails to make clear the two different 
senses of being an object. After clarifying the above obscurity, the doctrine of inner 
sense has another still obscurer problem, i.e., the problem of self-affection. “For we 
intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected; and this seems contradictory, 
because we [despite being active] would then have to relate to ourselves as passive." 
(B 153) The problem ofhow we are affected by ourselves is even more mysterious 
than the way we are affected by outer things. For the same “1” should be at the same 
time the one who actively intuits and who is passively intuited. According to the 
corresponding texts, Kant equates the active subject with the power of understanding 
and the passive with the capacity of sensibility. "Hence it is understanding which 
performs, on the passive subject whose power it is, that act 一 under the name of a 
90 By means ofa "subjective object," inner sense can only be viewed as presentations belonging to me, 
but not presentations of me. See Henry Allison, op. cit., pp.258 - 63. 
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transcendental synthesis of imagination — of which we rightly say that inner sense is 
affected by it."(B 153-4) 
However, I am not going to further explicate the details of self-affection. The 
first reason is that I am not confident enough to be able to get hold of the precise 
details of self-affection. Moreover, I am afraid that my tentative explication will 
bring about even more confusion. Fortunately, the problem we attempt to solve does 
not demand a detailed exposition of the problem of self-affection. Therefore, I shall 
only set forth what is evident and uncontroversial. From the above quotation, Kant 
intends to make clear that we can only intuit ourselves passively as we are inwardly 
affected. We do not have any intellectual intuition even concerning ourselves. Our 
intuitions are always sensible which are necessarily subject to the conditions of 
sensibility, and in the case of inner sense, the condition is time. This point is of 
crucial importance to the ontological status of the knowable self. Since we can only 
intuit ourselves in time, this self is the one in the phenomenal level instead of the 
noumenal self. Furthermore, all knowledge of ourselves, if any, requires an intuition 
besides the consciousness of thinking so that the concept can be determined. 
Therefore, it is obvious enough that all knowledge of ourselves is empirical which is 
subject to the same conditions as the way we know physical objects. 
The absolutely indubitable knowledge concerning our natures and existence, 
as pursued endlessly by the rationalists, is to Kant completely illegitimate. Actually, 
the doctrine of inner sense is already enough to refute the possibility of having 
rational knowledge of ourselves, but Kant's aim is even more than that. He wishes to 
disclose the natural disposition of pure reason which has the inclination to transcends 
its own legitimate realm of use. This nature of reason will eventually lead to an 
91 See also the translator's note 17 (Anth. 198-9) made by Mary J. Gregor in Anthropology from a 
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illusion that is unavoidable but resolvable. Thus, Kant carries out the project to lay 
bare the fallacy, and thereby keeps the reason in its proper domain. In the case of 
rational psychology, Kant sets forth the task of disclosing the fallacy ofits seemingly 
valid syllogisms and refutes any claim of rational knowledge of ourselves 
accordingly. This is the well-known chapter of Paralogisms. 
3.2.2. The Criticism of Rational Psychology 
The doctrine ofrational psychology is a metaphysical theory of the soul. This 
rational doctrine could not be mixed with even any slightest empirical elements, 
since otherwise it would no longer be rational but merely empirical psychology. 
"Hence / think is rational psychology's sole text, from which it is to unfold its entire 
wisdom." (A 343 / B 402) The “1” of“I think" is the subject ofknowing, judgment 
and apperception. It is the natural inclination of our reason to search for the 
properties of such a thinking being. Although we may consult experience so as to 
discover the desired properties, yet our inner senses are in continual flux, and 
therefore we could never achieve a systematic unity of all appearances of our soul. 
Our reason is certainly curious about the nature of soul in itself, and it will not satisfy 
with experiencing the soul in continual flux. This drive urges our reason to attempt a 
purely rational doctrine of our soul which is freed from any empirical elements. 
"Hence instead of this experiential concept (of what the soul actually is) 
——which cannot carry us far — reason takes the concept of the empirical 
unity of all thought; and by thinking this unity as unconditioned and 
original, reason tums this concept into a rational concept (idea) of a 
simple substance that, in itself immutable (personally identical), stands in 
community with other actual things outside it 一 in a word, the idea of a 
simple independent intelligence." (A 682 / B 710) 
Pragmatic Point of View. 
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The rational doctrine of soul presumes to prove the soul's substantiality, 
simplicity, unity and immortality^^ by syllogistic inferences from the bare form of" I 
think." However, the seemingly valid inference contains therein a paralogism. This 
paralogism is not only a logical fallacy which may be a result of careless, but also a 
fallacy precisely founded upon the very nature ofhuman reason. Kant maintains that 
the whole illusion of rational psychology is a paralogism based upon the following 
fallacious syllogism. 
“[Major Premise:] What cannot be thought otherwise than as subject also 
does not exist otherwise than as subject, and therefore is substance. 
[Minor Premise:] Now a thinking being, considered merely as such, 
cannot be thought otherwise than as subject [Conclusion:] Therefore, it 
also exists only as a subject, i.e., as substance.” (B 410-1) 
The above syllogism commits the fallacy of an ambiguous middle term (^er 
sophisma figurae dictionis [by a sophism of figure of speech]). Kant suggests that the 
middle term "thought" is taken in two entirely different meanings in the major and 
minor premises. Expressed more precisely, in the major premise, "What cannot be 
thought otherwise than as subject" refers to an object or a thing, and thus it is 
supposed to be something that may be given in intuition. Since this thing cannot be 
thought otherwise as subject, it is always the one to be predicated, not a predicate, 
and therefore it is a substance. However, in the minor premise, it only means a 
92 These four properties, substantiality, simplicity, unity and immortality, should be corresponding to 
the four moments of categories, i.e., relation, quality, quantity and modality. However, this set of 
naming does not follow that of Kant directly. They are reformulated by me. In the first edition of the 
Critique, the four properties read as substantiality, simplicity, personality and ideality respectively; 
while in the second edition, Kant have not put them in such a systematic manner. I think my current 
naming may probably be more intelligible than that in the first edition. Therefore, without violating 
Kant's original intention, I may be allowed to choose the terms more freely. For the relation between 
the above terms, see the following passage. "This substance, merely as object of inner sense, yields 
the concept of immateriality', as simple substance, that of incorruptibility. Its identity as intellectual 
substance yields personality, all the three of these components together, spirituality. The relation of 
the substance to objects yields commerce with bodies; and hence as so related it presents thinking 
substance as the principle of life in matter, i.e., as soul {anima) and as the basis of ammality; and 
animality as limited by spirituality presents immortality.” (A 345 / B 403) 
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thinking subject. It refers only to the form of thought that the subject of thinking 
must be thought as a thinking subject. This tautological expression does not mean the 
thinking subject to be an object. For the category of substance is not applicable to 
anything other than an object, and accordingly the syllogism cannot sustain the 
conclusion that the thinking subject is an actual thinking substance. 
Grounded upon the disclosure of this general fallacy, the four syllogisms, 
which purport to prove the soul's substantiality, simplicity, unity and immortality, 
are shown to suffer from similar errors, i.e., to be four paralogisms. All four 
paralogisms makes a general error by “substituting the subjective [element] of our 
presentation for the objective." (A 791 / B 819) From the bare form of thinking, “I 
think," we could arrive at several analytic claims about how the subject of thinking 
must conceive of itself. But, if we falsely take the analytically valid claims for some 
synthetic properties of the nature of a thinking being, a paralogism would be resulted. 
We shall not enter the details of each paralogism, but only follow the second 
edition (instead of the much more detailed first edition) by a brief sketch. The first 
paralogism pretends to prove the substantiality of soul. The refutation of the first 
paralogism is almost the same as the one appeared above in the explication of the 
general fallacy of paralogism. The “1” which is validly regarded as the subject of 
thinking is falsely equated with “an object, a being subsisting by myself, or [i.e.] 
substance:, (B 407) 
Furthermore, the “1” in all our thoughts cannot be resolved into different 
subjects, but it is always a logically simple subject. If we regard this logically simple 
subject as a simple substance, we fall into the second paralogism which purports to 
prove the simplicity of soul. Here again, the subjectively necessary way of 
conceiving the “1” is transformed to be an objective predicate of a thing. 
� 9 2 � 
f^ant's Transcendental Method and Its Under-Thematized Problem By Chong-Fuk Lau 
Besides, the third paralogism attempts to prove the unity or identity of the 
subject. The basic error is just similar to the previous two which mistakes the 
analytic proposition about the numerical identity of thinking subject for the persistent 
identity of a person. The latter claim should be justified by the intuition given by an 
object, but never by an analytic inference. 
Despite the similarity in error, the fourth paralogism attracts much more 
philosophical interests as well as practical significance. As an subject of thinking, I 
can distinguish myself from any other things including my body. For we should think 
ofthose outer things as distinguishable from me in order to make sense of the “1” as a 
thinking subject. This is again an analytic proposition which indicates the subjective 
necessary way of conceiving “1” as a thinking subject. However, if we proceed to 
prove that this distinctness implies that the “1” could exist even without anything 
outside it, it falls into a paralogism again. Therefore, it is invalid to prove from this 
logical distinctness to the immortality of soul. 
From the criticism of rational psychology, Kant's negative attitude towards 
the rational knowledge of our soul, which is supposed to be obtainable apart from the 
sensible conditions, is rather clear. All knowledge of soul as an object, if any, should 
be determined by inner sense empirically. Any attempt which promises the 
knowledge of our noumenal self is altogether erroneous and illusory. All these errors 
is ultimately founded upon the wrong conception of the expression “I think." 
Apparently, the “I think" cannot be equated with any empirical consciousness or 
inner sense, rather it denotes the very activity of our thinking which is self-
contradictory to deny. This peculiarity of“I think" misleads those acute philosophers, 
like Descartes, to regard it as a kind of immediate and non-empirical access to the 
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real and underlying (noumenal) nature of our soul; and they even intend to ground a 
whole science, rational psychology, upon this peculiar expression “I think.，， 
In order to criticize the doctrine of rational psychology, Kant has to show 
how it is fallacious to derive from the “I think" some properties of the soul as an 
object. Kant has achieved this task gracefully in the Paralogisms and we have also 
made a brief sketch above. The kemel of the criticism is the denial ofthe “I think" as 
an immediate access to the properties of the soul as an object. However, what is the 
positive characterization of this “I think"? What it could be, if it is neither an 
empirical self-intuition nor a rational self-knowledge? Fairly speaking, Kant's 
positive characterization of this “I think" is rare and obscure. 
"We can lay at the basis of this science [rational psychology] nothing but 
the simple, and by itself quite empty, presentation I, of which we cannot 
even say that it is a concept, but only a mere consciousness 
accompanying all concepts. Now through this I or he or it (the thing) that 
thinks, nothing more is presented than a transcendental subject of 
thoughts = X." (A 345-6 / B 404) 
"The consciousness that I have of myself in the presentation I is not an 
intuition at all, but is a merely intellectual presentation of a thinking 
subject's self-activity." (B 278) 
The above passages inform us that the presentation 'T' of “I think" is neither 
a concept nor an intuition, "but only a mere consciousness accompanying all 
concepts" or “a merely intellectual presentation of a thinking subject's self-activity." 
It is a commonplace that knowledge, according to Kant, requires two irreducible 
components, i.e., concept and intuition. If “I think" is neither of which, its 
incapability to attain Kantian knowledge is quite obvious. But what does he mean by 
a "mere consciousness" or an "intellectual presentation"? Before the clarification of 
these concepts, we should refrain from saying too much. More crucially, we on the 
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Other hand should not presume that the doctrine of inner sense and the criticism of 
rational psychology have already completed Kant's view of self-consciousness. For 
the time being, we should keep ourselves within what is said by Kant: we have no 
knowledge of our noumenal self, may it exist or not, and all knowledge of our 
phenomenal selfis subject to sensible conditions and determined by inner sense. 
3.3, Approaching a Coherent Interpretation 
After a concise elucidation ofKant's twofold doctrine of self-consciousness, 
we should now enter the crucial section of my thesis: an attempt to draw a coherent 
interpretation of Kant's doctrine of self-consciousness with respect to the problem 
inherited from his transcendental method. Above all, we shall point out the apparent 
conflict between the two positions. Yet this apparent conflict is not irresolvable. The 
conflict is apparent in the sense that it appears so only on the superficial level and 
only at the first glance, but yet it is not deeply rooted in the core of the problem. If 
we go deeper into the matter and if we do not stick to some common but simplified 
interpretations, the apparent conflict may be resolved. 
3.3.1. The Apparent Conflict and the Clue to Its Solution 
In the first half of my thesis, we have already shown that the key to 
transcendental method, or more concretely to transcendental deduction, is the access 
to the origin and source of our cognitive activities. The access of our cognitive power 
is the operative ground for the justification of the legitimacy of our knowledge 
claims. Moreover, the inquiry towards our own cognitive activities is only possible 
by means of a kind of reflection which is a “consciousness of the relation of given 
presentations to our various sources of cognition" (A 260 / B 316) However, the 
problem concerning the nature of this kind of consciousness seems to lead us into a 
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dead end. For it appears that this kind of consciousness can neither be equated with 
the intellectual nor empirical consciousness. 
If we read the reflection as a kind of empirical consciousness, then what is 
presented by reflection is nothing more than inner senses by which the phenomenal 
selfis revealed. The identification of empirical consciousness of ourselves with inner 
senses should be quite obvious, but we may still quote a supporting passage and find 
in it some significant insights. 
"There is, in inner perception, consciousness of oneself in terms of the 
determinations of one's state. This consciousness of oneself is merely 
empirical [emphasis added] and always mutable; it can give us no 
constant or enduring self in this flow of inner appearances. It is usually 
called inner sense, or empirical apperception;, (A 107) 
If we could access the origin of our cognitive activities only by means of an 
empirical consciousness or inner sense, the transcendental method or deduction 
would face a twofold difficulty. Firstly, both inner sense and empirical consciousness 
signify a kind of experience — a kind of inner experience we could have when we 
perceive the states of our phenomenal self. However, according to Kant, what is 
justified by appealing to experience does not yield true universality and necessity. 
This is the point he stated definitely and without ambiguity at the beginning of the 
Critique: "Experience does indeed tell us what is, but not that it must necessarily be 
so and not otherwise. And that is precisely why experience gives us no true 
universality." (A 1) Then, ifhis transcendental arguments were finally justified by a 
kind of empirical self-observation, how could he claim the conclusion to be universal 
and necessary? 
Secondly, the problem is even severer when we compare inner experience 
with that of outer. The physical objects we encounter in outer senses at least show 
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some regularity, then we may still claim some kind of comparative universality or 
generality by observing them. But, as we have already explicated in the preceding 
sections, our inner sense is in continual flux and we could not even find anything 
permanent in our inner sense. How could we discover the necessary form or elements 
of cognition from this kind of empirical consciousness? Therefore, equating 
reflection with empirical consciousness is tantamount to put a full stop to the 
possibility of transcendental inquiry. Either there is another way to access our 
cognitive activities, or we could have no transcendental inquiry at all! 
On the other hand, if we render reflection as a kind of intellectual 
consciousness, this rendering is also problematic. Clearly, intellectual consciousness 
should be a kind ofconsciousness that is freed from the sensible conditions, i.e., time 
and space. If we say that we have an intellectual consciousness of something, we 
should mean that we are conscious of something abstracted from the sensible 
conditions. When the thing is abstracted from its sensible conditions, it is no longer 
what it appears to us, but what it is in itself. Therefore, we may be led to regard the 
intellectual consciousness of ourselves as the consciousness of the noumenal self. 
Once we realize that the intellectual consciousness implies the consciousness of the 
noumenal self, we know that we are violating Kant's own position again. For in the 
Paralogisms, Kant develops an explicit and decisive criticism on the rational 
psychology which purports to claim rational knowledge of the soul (noumenal self). 
Therefore, the criticism of rational psychology apparently blocks the road of 
interpreting reflection as a kind of intellectual consciousness. 
The doctrine of inner sense indicates the inadequacy of empirical 
consciousness to the task set by transcendental inquiry, while the criticism of rational 
psychology blocks the way of allowing a kind of intellectual consciousness. If 
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reflection as a consciousness could neither be interpreted as intellectual nor empirical 
consciousness, then is there still another way out? Does transcendental philosophy 
arrive at a dead end? Or, is it self-contradictory? Fortunately, this apparent conflict is 
not the real essence of the problem. If we are cautious enough, we may find in the 
above explication of the dilemma the clue to its solution. Put it in short, the key to 
the possible solution is: not to equate the consciousness in the case of reflection with 
either the empirical consciousness of the phenomenal or the rational knowledge of 
the noumenal self. Reflection as an intellectual consciousness is different from both 
empirical consciousness and rational knowledge. Intellectual consciousness of our 
cognitive activities is certainly different from the empirical consciousness in the form 
of inner sense on the one hand, and also different from the immediate consciousness 
pretending to be some rational knowledge of our soul on the other. In order for us to 
understand the hidden but crucial difference, we should proceed to clarify the 
concept of self-consciousness and guard it against those common and liable 
misinterpretations. 
Instead of equating with either the empirical self-consciousness or the self-
cognition in rational psychology, the clue to the solution is to put the concept of 
intellectual self-consciousness in the light of the concept of Q)ure) apperception. 
“I call it [the presentation ‘I think'] pure apperception, in order to 
distinguish it from empirical apperception. Or, again, I call it original 
apperception\ for it is the self-consciousness [emphasis added] which, 
because it produces the presentation I think that must be capable of 
accompanying all other presentations[,] and [because it] is one and the 
same in all consciousness, cannot be accompanied by any further 
presentation. I also call the unity of this apperception the transcendental 
unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate that a priori cognition can 
be obtained from it.，’ (B 132) 
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The word "apperception" is the combination of two Latin words “acT and 
"'perceptio：" For "ad" means “to’，and “perceptio” means "perception," their 
combination “ad-perceptio” (or “apperceptio”�is the consciousness of the 
perception. Kant defines the original apperception as the self-consciousness "that 
must be capable of accompanying all other presentations." The crucial role of the 
transcendental apperception in Kant's Critical philosophy is beyond doubt, even it is 
“the supreme principle in all ofhuman cognition." (B 135) The unity of apperception 
is, accordingly to Kant, the ultimate unity of all our cognition and the ground of the 
possibility of experience. Transcendental apperception, as "the supreme principle in 
all of human cognition，，，is obviously erroneous to be equated with either the 
empirical self-consciousness or the self-cognition in the rational psychology. On the 
contrary, it is the pure consciousness accompanying all other presentations. But, what 
is the difference between this kind of pure (or intellectual) consciousness and the 
other two? What is the proper location of this kind of consciousness in Kant's 
transcendental philosophy? More important for us, what contributions could be given 
by the exposition of this consciousness to the problem inherited from the 
transcendental method? 
3.3.2. The Concept ofConsciousness in Self-Consciousness 
I do believe that few Kant scholars would disagree with the point that the 
ambiguity of the concept of self-consciousness is no less than its importance and 
significance in Kant's philosophy. It is precisely this serious ambiguity that leads us 
into confusion and distracts us from a possible coherent interpretation of Kant. The 
concept of self-consciousness leads easily to misunderstanding because it actually 
involves a twofold ambiguity, each concerning a moment of the compound concept, 
namely, the concept of“self，and "consciousness" respectively. The two moments of 
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the twofold ambiguity are interconnected with each other. We shall begin with the 
ambiguity of the concept of consciousness and then the ambiguity of the concept of 
self will be evoked accordingly. Through these explications, the concept of self-
consciousness will eventually be brought into light. 
3,3.2,1. Consciousness versus Experience 
The concept of intellectual self-consciousness is easily mixed up with either 
the empirical self-consciousness in the form of the inner sense or the rational self-
cognition as a doctrine of rational psychology. However, it is certainly different from 
both ofthem. Our task in the following two sections is to distinguish it from either of 
them respectively. We shall first enter the discussion concerning the difference 
between intellectual self-consciousness and that of the empirical. Their difference 
can be adequately shown by making clear the contrast between the concept of 
(intellectual) consciousness and that of experience. Let us begin the explication by a 
distinction made by Kant in the Anthropology. 
“If we consciously represent two acts: [that of] the inner activity 
(spontaneity) that makes a concept (a thought) possible, or reflection., and 
[that of] the receptiveness (receptivity) that makes perception 一 that is, 
empirical intuition 一 possible, we can then divide our self-consciousness 
{apperceptio) into self-consciousness of reflection and the self-
consciousness of apprehension. The first is a consciousness of 
understanding, pure apperception; the second is a consciousness of inner 
sense, empirical apperception., So it is wrong to call the first of these 
inner sense. In psychology we investigate ourselves according to our 
ideas of inner sense; in logic, according to what intellectual 
consciousness presents us with." (Anth. 15 note)^^ 
93 See also: "Experience is empirical knowledge; and knowledge (since it is based on judgments) 
requires reflection {reflexio) and, accordingly consciousness of our activity in combining the manifold 
of ideas according to a rule of the unity of the manifold 一 that is, it requires concepts and thought in 
general (as distinguished from intuition). Because of this, consciousness is divided into discursive 
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The above passage should be clear enough even without further explication. 
Kant divides the self-consciousness into two kinds, i.e., self-consciousness of 
reflection and the self-consciousness of apprehension. The former is the 
consciousness of the inner activity (spontaneity) that makes our thought possible, i.e., 
reflection; it is the pure or intellectual consciousness which is entitled pure 
apperception. While the latter is the consciousness of the receptiveness (receptivity) 
that makes perception possible, it is merely a consciousness of inner sense which is 
entitled empirical apperception. Therefore, there are two kind of apperception or 
self-consciousness. One is pure or intellectual and the other is empirical. Since what 
is pure is that “nothing empirical whatsoever is mixed with them," (B 3) the contrast 
between the two is clear enough. The empirical self-consciousness in the form of 
inner sense and the pure (or intellectual) self-consciousness stand exactly in 
opposition to each other and they should never be mixed up. 
We should note that Kant does not speak of this intellectual self-
consciousness negatively. The intellectual self-consciousness is not a limiting 
concept which draws the legitimate boundary for the empirical self-consciousness or 
inner sense. Its status is not the same as that of noumena in contrast with the 
phenomena. Rather, Kant sets forward this kind of self-consciousness positively. 
According to him, inner sense as to psychology is tantamount to the intellectual 
處 
consciousness as to logic. “In psychology we investigate ourselves according to our 
ideas of inner sense; in logic, according to what intellectual consciousness presents 
us with. [emphasis added]” Therefore, if Kant entitles his philosophy transcendental 
consciousness (which must come first since, as logical consciousness, it gives the rule) and intuitive 
consciousness. Discursive consciousness (pure apperception of our mental activity) is simple: the T 
of reflection contains no manifold and is always the same in every judgment, because it is merely the 
formal element of consciousness. Inner experience, on the other hand, contains the matter of 
consciousness and a manifold of empirical inner intuition, the 'I' of apprehension ( and so an 
empirical apperception)." (Anth. 22) 
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logic, we may even say that his philosophy is grounded upon this kind of intellectual 
self-consciousness. His positive attitude toward this kind of consciousness is even 
more explicitly expressed below. 
"When understanding is considered by itself alone, then its synthesis is 
nothing but the unity of the understanding's act: the act of which the 
understanding is conscious as an act even apart from sensibility.” (B 
153, my italics) 
Kant affirms without ambiguity that our understanding is conscious of the act 
of its own synthesis even apart from sensibility. What we are conscious of apart from 
sensibility is certainly not inner sense or empirical consciousness, but the intellectual 
self-consciousness of the spontaneity of understanding, i.e., the act of synthesis. But, 
we may then wonder whether there is anything that can be presented to us non-
empirically. If there is any intellectual self-consciousness, is it an experience or not? 
Kant himself has asked this question in a well-know Reflexion: “Is it an Experience 
that we Think?" (Ak. XVIII 318-9)94 As we all know that inner sense is certainly an 
experience, or more precisely an inner experience, its object is the phenomenal self 
under a determinate temporal order of presentations. However, Kant is now 
questioning whether thinking itself is an inner experience. In order to attempt an 
answer to this question, we have to consider whether this thinking is determined in 
the same temporal order with other inner and outer experiences. Finally, Kant arrives 
at a negative answer to the question. 
“If this consciousness (the consciousness of the act of thinking), were 
itself in tum empirical, then the same time determination would again 
have to be represented as contained under the conditions of the time 
determination of my state. It would, therefore, be necessary to conceive 
of another time under which (not in which) the time which constitutes the 
94 Reflexion 5661, English translation quoted from Henry Allison, op. cit., p. 276. 
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formal condition of my inner experience is contained. Consequently, 
there would be a time in which and simultaneously with which a given 
time flows, which is absurd. However, the consciousness of instituting an 
experience or, in general, of thinking, is transcendental consciousness, 
not experience：' (Ak. XVIII 319，my italics)'^ 
Kant expresses clearly that the consciousness of thinking is not an experience, 
but a transcendental consciousness. The argument to support the non-empirical 
character of this consciousness is in the form of reductio ad absurdum. If this 
consciousness is an experience, it has to be determined in a time series, since time is 
the a priori condition of all experience in general. However, the act of thinking itself 
is what determines our inner and outer experiences; that is to say, the act of thinking 
determines the time determination of experience. What determines the time 
determination of experience could not be itself determined in the same time, since 
otherwise what is determined by the time series would be the determining ground of 
the same time series. This is absurd. Then, if the consciousness of the act of thinking 
were itself empirical and determined in time, we have to posit another time 
determination other than the one determining the ordinary experience, i.e., a "meta-
time." However, it violates the unity of experience in one homogenous time which is 
made clear in the Transcendental Aesthetic and the First Analogy. Therefore, it is 
absurd to render the consciousness of the act of thinking as an experience. In short, 
"the consciousness of instituting an experience or, in general, of thinking, is 
transcendental consciousness, not experience." 
Only the “1” as the object of inner sense is empirical, but the “1” who thinks 
together with the consciousness of which is not empirical and hence it is not an 
experience. However, this may lead to a very undesirable consequence, i.e., there is a 
95 English translation quoted fromIbid., p. 277. 
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doubled “1.，，One is the subject of thinking，while the other is the object of 
perception. Certainly, Kant himself is aware of this problem, and he tackles it just 
after the above quotation in the Anthropology. 
"It looks to us, here, as if the 'V were doubled (which would be 
contradictory): 1) the T as subject of thinking (in logic), which signifies 
pure apperception (the merely reflecting ‘1’)，and about which there is no 
more to be said than that it is a perfectly simple idea. 2) the T as object 
of perception and so of inner sense, which contains a manifold of 
determinations that make an inner experience possible. Given the various 
changes within a man's mind (of his memory or of the principles he 
accepts), when he is conscious of these changes can he still say that he 
remains the very same (as far as his soul is concemed)? The question is 
absurd. For it is only because he thinks of himself in these various states 
as one and the same subject that he can be conscious of these changes; 
and man 's T is indeed twofold in terms of form (manner of 
representation), but not in terms of matter (content) [emphasis added].” 
(Anth. 15 note) 
Kant explains that if the 'T' were really doubled, it would be self-
contradictory. He resolves the seeming contradiction by making clear that the “1” is 
only twofold in terms of form or the manner of presentation, but not in terms of 
matter. But what does it mean? In every cognition, there must be some manifold 
structured by our form of thought. The sensation constitutes the material aspect, 
while the form of sensibility and understanding constitutes the form of structuring. 
The form and matter constitute the two inseparable moments of a cognition. In the 
case of self-consciousness, we have the consciousness ofboth the inner sensation and 
the act of understanding. The former kind of consciousness is empirical, while the 
latter is intellectual. The two poles constitute a unified moment of inner perception. 
The structured sensation forms the 'T' as an object of perception, while the 
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Structuring power forms the 'T ' ofthinldng. The doubled ‘ T is actually the same one 
in terms of content, but regarded as two distinguishable poles. There is always a 
thinking subject which determines what is being thought and itself can never be 
objectified as an object of thought. This point is rendered expressly by Allison: 
“This objectified thought is always objectified by and for another 
consciousness that does objectifying. Consciousness (the act of thinking) 
is thus incapable of grasping itself as object precisely because it must 
always be presupposed as already on the scene, doing the objectifying."^^ 
With the above elucidation, we should be ready to notice that not all self-
consciousness is empirical. Kant allows (and must allow) an intellectual 
consciousness which is the consciousness of the act of thinking. The two kinds of 
consciousness do not point to two distinct 'T's, but two poles of the same “1”. They 
are inseparable in the same moment of self perception, but distinguishable from each 
other. The empirical consciousness is the ground of empirical psychology, while the 
intellectual consciousness is that of logic. Therefore, ifKant's transcendental method 
assumes an immediate and non-empirical access to our cognitive powers by 
reflection, reflection must be a kind of intellectual self-consciousness. 
3,3,2.2. Consciousness versus Cognition 
After distinguishing the intellectual consciousness from that of the empirical, 
one may normally proceed to ask whether the intellectual self-consciousness could 
yield any rational self-cognition at all. If we could derive some cognition of oneself 
from the intellectual consciousness, does it mean that we could establish a doctrine of 
rational psychology? Then，would it be in conflict with Kant's criticism in 
Paralogismsl These are the questions we have to deal with in this section. 
96 H)id., p. 278. 
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The second ambiguity of the concept of consciousness rests on its possible 
confusion with that of cognition (or knowledge). For in the case of empirical self-
consciousness, the consciousness of ourselves provides the manifold in the form of 
inner sense. Then, empirical self-consciousness in the form of inner sense is an 
intuition which can determine the concept from understanding and thereby yield 
cognition of ourselves. That is to say, we can attain empirical self-cognition from 
empirical self-consciousness. Therefore, in the empirical level, the consciousness of 
oneself is closely related to the cognition of oneself. However, this connection does 
not hold in the same manner in the case of intellectual consciousness. 
“Consciousness of oneself is far from being a cognition of oneself 
emphasis added], regardless of all categories, which make up the 
thought of an object as such through the combination of the manifold in 
one apperception. We saw that in order for me to cognize an object 
different from myself, I not only require the thinking (which I have in the 
category) of an objects as such, but do also require an intuition whereby I 
determine that universal concept. In the same way, in order to cognize 
myself, too, I not only require the consciousness of myself or the fact that 
I think myself, but require also an intuition of the manifold in me 
whereby I determine this thought.." (B 158) 
In the above passage, the term "consciousness of oneself signifies the 
"synthetic original unity of apperception" which means that “I am conscious only 
that the I am." (B 157) Here the consciousness of oneself clearly means a kind of 
intellectual consciousness, and therefore “this presentation is a thought, not an 
intuition.” (B 157) Precisely because this consciousness is not an intuition, it is far 
from being a cognition of oneself. For every cognition, according to Kant, needs an 
intuition which provides the corresponding manifold for the determination of the 
universal concept. Although the empirical self-consciousness as an inner sense 
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provides manifold, but the intellectual self-consciousness does not. This 
consciousness is not presented through our sensibility, but just a thought that we 
think ourselves. As no intuition can be found in this consciousness to determine the 
thought (B 157-8), this consciousness does not yield any cognition of ourselves. 
This position is not only perfectly coherent with the criticism of rational 
psychology, but also further characterizes the fundamental error of those rationalists. 
They wrongly infer from the intellectual consciousness of oneself to the rational 
cognition of oneself. From this bare consciousness, we could never attain any 
empirical cognition of oneself, let alone those claim to be indubitably certain. In the 
above quotation (B 158) and the criticism of rational psychology, Kant's intention is 
to argue against the inference from the intellectual consciousness of oneself to the 
rational cognition of oneself. However, we should be cautious enough not to reverse 
his argument. That is to say, the illegitimacy of claiming any rational cognition of 
oneselfdoes not imply the denial of any intellectual consciousness of oneself. In fact, 
Kant clearly and repeatedly acknowledges that we do have such an intellectual 
consciousness. But the crucial point is that no rational psychology can be built upon 
it. 
Therefore, we should not employ the model of empirical consciousness to 
interpret the intellectual, and thereby confuse the distinction between consciousness 
and cognition. Empirical consciousness serves as the manifold of cognition, but 
intellectual consciousness is not a manifold at all. Hence, no cognition can be yielded 
from it. We have to draw a sharp distinction between the intellectual self-
consciousness and the rational self-cognition. Although many commentators 
sometimes use the two terms interchangeably, the correct understanding of Kant's 
philosophy should be based upon the cautious distinction of them. Let us borrow the 
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remark on the distinction between consciousness and cognition (knowledge) by a 
famous Kant scholar, Gottfried Martin, to end up this section. 
“This self-consciousness of the ‘I think’ is so to speak only the self-
consciousness of a point, it is not knowledge properly speaking. It cannot 
be real knowledge because in such knowledge the pure spontaneity of 
knowing would itselfhave to become the known."^^ 
3.3.3. The Concept of Self in Self-Consciousness 
In the above sections, we have already explicated the possible confusions of 
the concept of "consciousness" with either the concept of experience or cognition. 
After distinguishing it from the two misunderstandings, still we have to explicate 
another moment of the concept of "self-consciousness," i.e., the concept of "self." If 
we are going to have cognition of a thing, no matter what it is, it has to be presented 
to us as an object. The object for cognition is the compound [concretum] of universal 
concepts as determined by particular intuitions. In the case of self-cognition, my very 
self has to be presented as a soul. In the empirical level, we may have such and such 
cognition of this empirical self, say, its existence, identity or causal relations with 
other phenomenal objects. However, if we attempt to derive any cognition of the self 
concerning what it is in itself, it would only result in a paralogism. Therefore, 
rational self-cognition of this “self’ as an individual soul is absolutely impossible. 
Nevertheless, when we put forward that there is certain intellectual self-
consciousness, the meaning of “self，is not simply tantamount to the one in "self-
cognition." For (intellectual) consciousness, as different from cognition, is not a 
compound of universal concepts and particular intuitions, but only a thought without 
97 Gottfried Martin, Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of Science, P. G. Lucas tr., New York: Bames & 
Noble, 1955,p. 180. 
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an intuition. Therefore, what is being conscious of, the intentum” is far from being 
an object in the strict sense of the term (as what is being known). 
“The consciousness that I have of myself in the presentation I is not an 
intuition at all, but is a merely intellectual presentation of a thinking 
subject's self-activity. Hence this I also does not have the least predicate 
of intuition that, as permanent, could serve as correlate for the time 
determination in inner sense." (B 278) 
What is being conscious ofby the intellectual self-consciousness is not an “1” 
as an object. It does not provides any predicate of intuition that serves as the correlate 
for the determination of an object. Rather, it “is a merely intellectual presentation of 
a thinking subject's self-activity." But, this phrase needs a very careful explication. 
What we are conscious of in the intellectual self-consciousness is the self-activity. 
We may still say that it is the self-activity of a thinking subject. However, the 
thinking subject is not presented as an object as other physical things. The self-
activity is not an attribute of the thinking subject, because the thinking subject is not 
an object in the strict sense. What we are conscious of is not the self-activity as an 
attribute of an object called thinking subject, but only the very self-activity as such. 
However, it may still be legitimate for us to use the phrase “a thinking subject's self-
activity" or "the self-activity of a thinking subject," provided that their relation is not 
understood in the same way as an attribute of an empirical object. Their relation is 
actually of a different sort. For the intellectual presentation of self-activity can never 
be understood as something other than my presentation, otherwise it "would be 
presented to me that could not be thought at all 一 which is equivalent to saying that 
98 We borrow the phenomenological word “intentum” to signify what is being conscious of. This word 
is coined by phenomenology to signify one of the two poles {intentum and intentio) of intentionality. 
We use the word “intentum” in contrast with the word "object." For Kant the word "object" in the 
strict sense signifies only what is being known, i.e., consists ofboth concept and intuition. Since what 
is being conscious of in the case of intellectual consciousness is only a thought but not an intuition, it 
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the presentation either would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me." (B 
132) Therefore, we have to presuppose a thinking subject who is accompanying the 
intellectual presentation, though this subject is not objectively determinable (or 
knowable). Therefore, it may be more adequate to express the point in this way: the 
self-consciousness is a merely intellectual presentation of [a thinking subject's] self-
activity. The term “thinking subject's" had better to be put into bracket so as to 
indicate its special status. This profound point is elaborately expressed by Allison. 
"It is a consciousness of the activity of thinking, not a thinker. This 
parallels the view that the objects of inner sense are the contents of the 
mind (its cogitationes), not the mind itself. Taken as a whole, then, this 
position maintains that the contrast between inner sense and apperception 
is between a consciousness of the contents of mind (taken as "subjective 
objects") and a consciousness of the activity of thinking. There is no 
room for any additional consciousness of a mind or thinker who owns 
these thoughts and is engaged in this activity."^^ 
Therefore, what we are conscious of is not a self as an object, even not any 
properties of this self. Instead, we are only conscious of the self-activity or the act of 
understanding's synthesis. The term self-activity or the act of synthesis does not 
mean any state of affairs that happens in time, for it does not refer to any causal 
relation between different objects. On the contrary, it is a mere consciousness as the 
form of cognition. 
“...consciousness in itself is not so much a presentation distinguishing a 
particular object, as rather a form of presentation as such insofar as this 
presentation is to be called cognition; for only of such presentation can I 
say that I think anything through it." (A 346 / B 404, my italics) 
is wrong to call it an object in the strict sense. As we need a generic name to signify what is being 
conscious of, I found that the phenomenological word “intentum” is quite appropriate to our purpose. 
99 Henry Allison, op. cit., p. 290, my italics. 
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The concept of consciousness denotes only a form of presentation for 
cognition. As we know, any cognition, accordingly to Kant, consists of formal and 
material aspects. The material can only be given through sensibility as manifold. 
While both power of sensibility and understanding possess their own form: the 
former is space and time, while the latter is the category. The latter provides the 
synthetic unity of any cognition and it is the form to which every cognition has to 
conform. Therefore, when we say that consciousness is a form of presentation for 
cognition, it means that we are conscious of the structure of our cognition, i.e., the 
unity determined by the categories. The unity determined by the categories is just the 
unity determined by the act of synthesis of understanding. Therefore, what we are 
conscious of by the intellectual consciousness is the form of our cognition or the act 
of understanding's synthesis. This act of synthesis is the act of combining and 
unifying; this act together with its consciousness constitute the very essence of the 
power of understanding. Martin's exposition confirms again our interpretation: "All 
combination is a combining, all unity a unifying. The fact of this spontaneity and the 
consciousness of this underlie the whole development of the argument in the Critique 
ofPure Reasonr'^^ 
Therefore, the “self’ in the "self-consciousness" does not mean an individual 
person, but the form of cognition or the act of synthesis as such. Put it paradoxically, 
it should be read as a self-consciousness of consciousness rather than the self-
consciousness of self. If we have to assign the generic name for the ‘‘intentum” of 
self-consciousness, we may say that it is the human intellect or simply the reason in 
the board sense. Still, reason, in this connection, is not presented as the object of self-
consciousness, but it is always immanent in every act of cognition. 
100 Gottfried Martin, op. cit., p. 178. 
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3.3.4. The Problem ofReflection Revisited 
After examining each moment of the concept of self-consciousness, now we 
should be ready to recognize Kant's attitude towards the intellectual self-
consciousness. As we have explicated in the preceding sections, this kind of 
consciousness must be sharply distinguished from both the empirical self-
consciousness (inner sense) and the rational self-cognition (rational psychology). In 
contrast, Kant affirms a kind of intellectual consciousness of the act of 
understanding's synthesis or the form of cognition. After making clear such a 
difficult concept, let us revisit the problem inherited from the transcendental method 
and see whether the problem could be brought into light accordingly. 
As we have shown in the first part of the thesis, the key to a transcendental 
deduction is the immediate access to the origin and source of cognition under the 
name of reflection. However, the nature of reflection once brought us into 
bewilderment. What is the nature of reflection? What kind of consciousness is it? Is it 
a kind of knowledge? ... After going through the problem of self-consciousness, we 
may be ready to give a more adequate elucidation of the concept of reflection and 
thereby to solve the possibility ofKant's transcendental arguments. 
Reflection "is our state of mind when we first set about to discover the 
subjective conditions under which [alone] we can arrive at concepts. It is 
our consciousness of the relation of given presentations to our various 
sources of cognition ——the consciousness through which alone the 
relation of these presentations to one another can be determined 
correctly" (A 260 / B 316’ my italics) 
Reflection as a consciousness is certainly of the kind of the intellectual. As 
Kant himself also uses the term "transcendental reflection," (A 262 / B 319) this use 
suffices to indicates that this kind of consciousness is not empirical, since otherwise 
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it would never deserve the name of transcendental. It is the immediate and non-
empirical consciousness of the relation of different presentations to the sources ofour 
cognition. It does not pretend to be any rational cognition of the self, but the mere 
consciousness of the form of our cognition and the act of synthesis. It is the way of 
access to our cognitive power and serves as the ground of any transcendental inquiry. 
Following Kant's text, we may proceed to characterize reflection as a 
consciousness accompanying our cognitive activities which reveals at the same time 
the interrelationships among the various sources of cognition. The most crucial 
characteristic of reflection is that it is only an accompaniment of other cognitive 
activities, but not itself a complete act. For what could be revealed by reflection is 
not an object, but only the form of cognitive activities. The mere form without 
intuition does not yield any single act of cognition in the same way as we know other 
physical objects empirically. Instead, it is always immanent in every cognition we 
made of objects. As an accompaniment of our cognitive activities, reflection is never 
a self-subsistent or self-originated activity, rather it always hangs on other cognitive 
activities, and remains always as an accompaniment, or maybe we could say, it is 
merely a "by-product" of cognitive activities. This conforms to the very spirit of 
transcendental philosophy. Transcendental philosophy does not claim to be a doctrine 
of rational knowledge concerning the supersensible world. On the contrary, the 
transcendental inquiry is an attempt to make sense of and account for what we 
encounter in the empirical world. All transcendental inquiry would make no sense, 
were it not based on the ordinary experience. In the same way, reflection does not 
pretend to yield any rational knowledge of a supersensible cognitive subject, it only 
reveals the characteristics of our form of cognition and thereby accounts for the usual 
way we know objects. 
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Reflection, as an accompaniment, is always implicit and immanent in our 
cognition, by which we can be simultaneously aware of our cognitive activities, and 
even the principles or rules they rest upon. However, this consciousness does not 
exhaust all characteristics of our cognitive activities, otherwise all inquiry or 
investigation would be superfluous. This characterization is expressed concisely by 
Henrich. 
“Reflection in not a descriptive let alone an exhaustive knowledge of the 
processes and operations of cognition. It is only an awareness of what is 
specific to them, presumably the general principles and rules upon which 
they rely.”ioi 
By reflection，we are aware of what is specific to our cognitive activities. This 
awareness lays the ground for setting forth a transcendental inquiry. As reflection 
does not exhaust all characteristics of our cognitive powers, an investigation 
grounded upon what is revealed by reflection is needed so as to bring the partial 
characteristics into systematic unity. According to Kant, reflection and investigation 
actually lie on two different levels. However, their difference has not been very 
clearly indicated in the Appendix; but in the Lectures on Logic [The Blomberg 
Logic], Kant states the difference explicitly^ 
“Reflecting is distinct from investigating and investigation. To reflect is 
to compare something with the laws of understanding. To investigate, 
however, is actually to reflect mediately. Concerning many things we can 
quite well cognize without investigation what is true, what false. But 
reflection, on the other hand, is always necessary for any judgment, and 
for the distinction of the true from the false, even if it be in general, or in 
a [particular] cognition, etc., in all cases indispensable." (Logic 127) 
101 Dieter Henrich, "Kant's Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First 
Critique,” op. cit., pp. 42 - 3. 
102 The following exposition of the pair of concepts, investigation and reflection, besides basing on 
Kant's own texts, also owes its originality to Henrich's essay. See Ibid., esp. pp. 40 — 45. 
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The above passage indicates clearly the point that reflection and investigation 
actually lies on two different levels. In a word, reflection precedes investigation. 
Investigation is a deliberated activity that takes something as the theme of research, 
while reflection is only an accompaniment of our cognitive activities that we are 
aware of our cognition immediately. Reflection "is always necessary for any 
judgment," and thus it accompanies all our cognitive activities. This indicates a very 
crucial characteristic of our cognitive power, i.e., our cognition is，to certain extent, 
transparent to itself. Henrich makes the point more clearly. 
“Reflection always takes place. Without any effort on our part, we always 
spontaneously know (albeit, informally and without explicit articulation) 
about our cognitive activities and about the principles and rules they 
depend upon. Reflection in this sense is a precondition of rationality.”��] 
Furthermore, reflection is in fact the operative condition of investigation. 
Investigation must rely on the source of the philosophical insight provided by 
reflection. Reflection mediates between an investigation and our cognitive activities. 
That is why Kant has the following remark: “To investigate ... is actually to reflect 
mediately." Therefore, when we carry out a transcendental inquiry (investigation), 
the investigation must be founded upon what can be revealed by reflection, for it is 
the sole means that the origin of our cognitive activities can be reached. As a result, 
investigation can never transcend the domain within which reflection is operative. 
Although certain characteristics of our cognition has already revealed by reflection, 
we still need an investigation founded upon reflection to lay bare what is not explicit 
and to bring the various awareness to systematic interconnectedness. Therefore, 
investigation and reflection are two inseparable parts of a transcendental inquiry. 
iG3 IbicL, p. 42’ my italics. 
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Now, the crucial role of reflection in Kant's transcendental philosophy should 
be rather clear. By reflection, we can be conscious of the form ofour cognition or the 
act of understanding's synthesis immediately. The ability to reflect is actually the 
very essence ofour cognitive power. Reflection serves as the operative ground ofany 
transcendental investigation. Only by grounding such an immediate consciousness of 
our cognitive activities could we set forward a transcendental inquiry and formulate a 
transcendental argument. 
3,4. The Need of Further Exploration 
Stimulated by the quest for rational knowledge of objects, Kant sets forth an 
ambitious project of transcendental philosophy. In this thesis, we have attempted to 
explicate the nature and structure of the method he employed in the central 
arguments. After a cautious attempt, we found that Kant's transcendental method 
assumes a certain kind of immediate and non-empirical access to our cognitive 
activities. This is an intellectual self-consciousness called reflection. Unfortunately, 
Kant himself has not spent enough effort to clarify this crucial concept. Therefore, it 
is our task to save it from possible misunderstandings. We have deliberately 
differentiated the intellectual consciousness from both the empirical self-
consciousness (inner sense) and the rational self-cognition (rational psychology). 
Basing on such clarification, we could attain a more adequate understanding of the 
peculiar nature and the significant role of reflection. The purported interpretation not 
only can account for the ground of transcendental arguments, it also forms a coherent 
interpretation of Kant's project of transcendental philosophy in general and the 
doctrine of inner sense and his criticism of rational psychology in particular. 
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Nevertheless, I think, no interpretation could ever claim complete adequacy. 
Every interpretation has its point of reference and limitations. Therefore, instead of 
pretending to be a final solution, one had better point out the host of possible 
problems related to a particular interpretation so as to make way for further 
investigation. In our case, the problem is even severer. Our interpretation is bounded 
not only by our own limitation, but also by Kant's own silence and ambiguity 
towards the problem. Thus, we can at most point out the problem and thereby 
indicate the possible way of further exploration. 
In the previous sections, we have already spent much effort in distinguishing 
the concept of consciousness from that of cognition.'®^ Certainly, the intellectual 
consciousness does not yield any cognition of objects, neither in the form of rational 
psychology nor as empirical cognition of physical objects. However, as we are 
conscious of our understanding's act of synthesis or the form of cognition, could this 
consciousness be expressed as the cognition of our cognitive powerl Though this 
consciousness is a mere thought without any intuition, but if we could express the 
mere form of cognition by words and develop a deduction showing the form to be the 
necessary conditions of knowledge, is it simply another kind of cognition or 
knowledge? In some occasions, Kant himself even maintains that his Critique is to 
take up the task of attaining a self-cognition of reason. 
"And it is a call to reason to take on once again the most difficult of all 
its tasks 一 viz., that of self-cognition [Selbsterkenntnis] 一 and to set up 
a tribunal that will make reason secure in its rightful claims and will 
dismiss all baseless pretensions, not by flat but in accordance with 
reason's etemal and immutable laws. This tribunal is none other than the 
critique of reason itself: the critique of pure reason.” (A xi - xii, my 
bold) 
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Kant consistently holds that every cognition consists of both intuition and 
thought. If there is self-cognition of reason. Does it mean that we have the pure or 
empirical intuition of reason? However, both are infeasible，since pure intuition of 
ourselves is openly denied by Kant, while self-cognition of reason by empirical 
means is only contingent and therefore contradictory to the very nature of reason. 
Then, does it mean that the mere thought (intellectual consciousness) of self-activity 
suffices to constitute the self-cognition of reason? This might be the case. For if 
reason is knowable, it has to be known in a way other than that through which we 
know other objects simply because it is not an object, but a subject. Kant has spent so 
much effort in tackling the problem of cognition of object, but he is quite silent in the 
case of cognition of subject. Does the intellectual consciousness suffice to yield 
cognition of our cognitive power (subject)? Kant seems to have a positive attitude 
towards this problem. But then, is this cognition subject to the form of categories? 
The answer appears to be negative. 
"Apperception is itself the basis of the possibility of the categories, which 
in tum present nothing but the synthesis of the manifold of intuition 
insofar as this manifold has unity in apperception. Hence self-
consciousness as such is the presentation of what is the condition of all 
unity and is yet itself unconditioned. Hence we can say about the 
thinking I (the soul) — which thinks itself as substance, as simple, as 
numerically identical in all time, and as the correlate of all existence from 
which all other existence must be inferred — that it cognizes not so much 
itself through the categories, but cognizes the categories, and through 
them all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception and hence through 
itself. Now it is, indeed, very evident that what I must presuppose in 
order to cognize an object at all cannot itselfbe cognized as an object by 
me, and that the determining self (the thinking) is distinct from the 
determinable self (the thinking subject) as cognition is distinct from the 
104 See Section 3.3.2.2 (Consciousness versus Cognition) on page 105. 
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object [cognized]. Nonetheless, nothing is more natural and tempting 
than the illusion of regarding the unity in the synthesis of thoughts as a 
perceived unity in the subject of these thoughts. One might call this 
illusion the subreption of the hypostatized self-consciousness 
{apperceptionis suhstantiatae)：' (A 401-2，my bold) 
Kant holds that apperception does not know itself through categories, but 
know the categories through itself. But it is just hard to imagine what could be 
known without employing anyone of the categories. I do think that Kant is not so 
much aware of the outstanding importance of the problem of self-cognition of subject 
(reason). Although Kant has dealt with similar problem in other works, for instance, 
the concept of fact of reason^^^ in the second Critique and the Selbstsetzungslehre 
(OP 170-99) in the Opus Postumum, his position on this problem is hard to settle and 
any interpretation would face severe difficulties. 
Plainly, the problem is left under-thematized by Kant. However, Kant's 
under-thematization may be rooted in the nature of the problem itself. The problem 
of self-cognition or self-consciousness of reason is without exaggeration among the 
most difficult and most important problems. In spite of this under-thematization, 
Kant has himself already indicated a new direction to deal with the problem. The new 
direction rests on the new conception of cognitive subject coined by Kant. Instead of 
identifying the subject (or the soul) as a substantial entity, he always characterizes 
the cognitive subject by a set of correlated concepts, including the concept of 
“activity” and “synthesis.’，This conception of subject highly influences the thoughts 
of Kant's successors, and this somewhat hidden problem inherited from Kant's 
105 ‘‘Consciousness of this fundamental law [moral law] may be called a fact of reason [emphasis 
added] because one cannot reason it our from antecedent data of reason ... and because it instead 
forces itself upon us of itself as a synthetic a priori proposition that is not based on any intuition, 
either pure or empirical, ... as a positive concept, an intellectual intuition would be required, which 
certainly cannot be assumed here. However, in order to avoid misinterpretation in regarding this law 
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philosophy tums out to be a very important question in the subsequent development 
ofoccidental philosophy, a question which still engages the attention ofmany a great 
philosophical spirit up to our days. 
as given, it must be noted carefully that it is not an empirical fact but the sole fact of pure reason 
which, by it, announces itself as originally lawgiving (sic volo, sic Jubeo)." (CPrR 164-5) 
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4. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, we began with the quest for rational knowledge as set forth by 
the ancient Greeks. The problem is taken up by Kant. In the first Critique, Kant 
attempts to ground the possibility of arriving a priori at synthetic knowledge of 
objects. This task needs a very peculiar type of argument which has to be forceful 
enough to prove the objective reality (or universal validity) of pure concepts and the 
derived principles. In the first half of this thesis, I have tried my best to elucidate the 
nature and structure ofhis transcendental method/®^ In the corresponding sections, I 
have argued that Kant's transcendental method must assume a kind of immediate and 
non-empirical access to the origin of our cognitive power. This access is a kind of 
intellectual consciousness called reflection. 
In the second half of this thesis, I proceed to explicate the nature of the 
intellectual self-consciousness by distinguishing it from probable confusion with 
either the empirical self-consciousness (inner sense) or the rational self-cognition 
(rational psychology). After clarifying the nature of reflection as an intellectual self-
consciousness, its being the ground of transcendental inquiry can be shown 
accordingly. The purported interpretation aims at attaining a coherent interpretation 
ofKant 's transcendental method and the problem of self-consciousness with respect 
to the various parts ofhis transcendental philosophy. 
Finally, we have to confess that the problem of self-consciousness or self-
cognition of cognitive subject, despite its outstanding importance, is under-
thematized by Kant. Following my interpretation ofKant, his philosophy begins with 
the mission of justifying the rational knowledge of objects and arrives at the under-
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thematized problem. If this is true, then Kant, who consciously takes up the problem 
ofknowledge which is an immediate result of the empiricist-rationalist dispute on the 
one hand and a remote inheritance from Greek antiquity on the other, falls eventually 
back to the cry of Socrates: ''Know thyself,” Starting with Xenophanes' dictum on the 
problem of knowledge, we have embarked upon a host of questions and queries, 
traversing notions such as self-consciousness and reflection. After traveling through 
this long long road, the problem seems to be accountable only by referring to the 
motto of another Greek philosopher, Socrates. The motto "Know thyself," as written 
on the pediments of the temple of Apollo at Delphi/。？ reveals the very core of the 
genuinely philosophical problem which still prevails in the philosophical discussions 
of our days. 
106 An summary can be found in Section 2.3 (Transition to the Under-Thematized Problem) on page 
71f. 
107 See Jean Bmn, Socrates, Douglas Scott tr., New York: WaUcer and Company, 1962, pp. 47 - 63. 
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